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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

People use web applications and services every day. They encounter many cyberattacks in their daily lives (e.g., phishing and Domain Name System spoofing attacks).
Websites or apps may send numerous spam emails. Many users have connected to
legitimate websites with erroneous or self-signed certificates [1]. They may unnecessarily
disclose identity information and thus put their privacy at risk. Identity information may
be collected and even maliciously used. Computer security companies provide security
products and services to protect users from attacks. For example, Google applies security
mechanisms to software services such as Chrome, Google Search, and Google Maps [2].
Windows 10 focuses on enhancing security with more secure default settings, security
patches and updates, and security software such as Windows Defender [3].
Although security services are developed and offered to users, many people still
fall into attackers’ traps. Ransomware was one of the worst cyber-attacks in 2017. It is
transmitted by email or webpage pop-ups. It locked people’s computer data and
threatened to destroy the data if a ransom was not paid. It affected 200,000 Windows
computers in more than 150 countries, including United States, China, Japan, Germany
and Britain [4]. Many users were affected because they “forgot” to keep their Windows
up-to-date with the latest security enhancement. However, Windows often reminds users
update their system. Many users just ignore the warnings, focus their attention on a
1

primary computer-use task, and do not consciously consider the riskiness of their
activities. Humans are not very good at mitigating cyber-attacks. They are considered the
weakest component in security systems [5].
Warnings are used as one of the last lines of defense in computer security and are
fundamental to users’ security interactions with technology. When people see computer
warnings, however, most of the time they ignore them [6]. Some people do not even
notice security warnings. On the other hand, when individuals are asked their concerns
about their private information, they claim that they are careful about their information
[7]. This contradiction may be explained by the ineffectiveness of warnings [8]. The
effectiveness of warnings depends on the fact that they attract users’ attention,
communicate clearly about the risks, and provide straightforward instructions for
avoiding the hazards.
Researchers have actively sought to understand how users interact with security
warnings and why warnings are so widely ignored [9]. Frameworks, such as the
Communication–Human Information Processing (C-HIP) model [14], the sequential
model of human information processing [15], and the performance model [16], are used
by warning researchers to understand human information processing of warnings [14].
Questionnaires and interviews before and after experiments are used to analyze the
effectiveness of a new warning design. Different techniques have been applied to
improve existing warnings [10][11][12][13].
Warning designers want to know how to improve a specific component of their
warnings. If a warning with a symbol and multiple lines of words are often ignored by
users, designers want to know which part of the warning (the symbol, the message, or

2

both) could improve and how to improve it. Existing frameworks do not provide
evaluations and suggestions to improve different warning components (symbols, signs,
and messages) separately. Particular input and output could be applied to improve
computer warnings, such as mouse movements, keyboard inputs, or even eye-gaze
movements. These inputs and outputs were not well addressed by the existing
frameworks. Computer warning designers need a framework to provide guidance
specifically based on computer warning processes.
With the significance of a warning framework, and the limitations of current
warning frameworks in mind, we provide an analysis of research on computer warnings
and propose a framework named the Leveled Human Behavior Warning (LHBW) model.
Based on the LHBW model, we group computer warning designs and evaluations into
five levels: warning stimuli, warning perception, warning storage and memory retrieval,
decision-making, and behavior. At each level, we classify and analyze current warnings
designs. The LHBW model focuses on providing approaches to help computer warning
designers enhance their warnings. Techniques to improve different computer warning
components are also suggested. Specific computer-based inputs are integrated. Using the
LHBW model, designers could also analyze how their warnings are processed. We
analyze existing warning approaches using the LHBW model and our taxonomy
(including warning stimuli, perception factors, long-term memory, decision-making, and
types of behavior).
We found some limitations of previous warning research. First, researchers do not
usually provide quantitative information about users' attention during the experiments.
Secondly, users' attention (eye gaze information) was not used as an input for warnings.
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Third, attention switch and the cost of compliance are hard to evaluate. For example, a
warning with a “close” button will force attention switch, but will also interrupt users’
current task. Users’ attention is critical to warning designs [14] but users may feel
annoyed if their working tasks are interrupted too many times. Fourth, subconscious level
stimuli are not used or analyzed in warning countermeasures to protect people from
identity disclosure. The approaches presented in this dissertation address these issues.
We focus on two topics, a dynamic supraliminal warning system using eye gaze
information and a subliminal warning system.
First, we propose a dynamic warning system using eye gaze information. The
dynamic supraliminal warnings show “at the right time and at the right place."
Supraliminal warnings include stimuli that are above the absolute threshold and can be
comprehended by the conscious mind. We assess and evaluate users’ attention to warning
messages by analyzing eye gaze data and recording users’ eye gaze movements. Our
dynamic warnings fade out automatically and thus they reduce the cost of compliance.
Users need not take any action to close the warning. The warning guides the user’s
attention by popping up where the user is looking. In this research, eye gaze information
is used not only in our evaluation but also is integrated into warning design. We
developed an Eye Tracking Information Analysis (ETIA) tool to determine the warning’s
show-up time and fade-out time. The ETIA is also used to evaluate the effectiveness of
the dynamic warning and to record participants’ eye gaze movements.
Second, people realize that there are certain events of which they are not
consciously aware [15]. These events may seem to play very little part in our daily lives.
But they are almost invisible roots of our conscious thoughts. Psychology named this
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information processing as “subliminal,” below the threshold of consciousness. A large
body of literature suggests that subliminal priming can be powerful enough to influence
people’s emotional reactions to unfamiliar objects or even affect behavior [16]–[18].
Taking advantage of this feature, people use subliminal priming to influence purchase
behavior, to help them lose weight, or even to influence behavior in an election. We
conducted a preliminary study using a web crawler. We have crawled 3,070,489
webpages 96.6 GB data. We discover 39,055 short timer durations (less than 100ms) and
discovered 104 webpages using potential subliminal stimuli. Figure 1.1 illustrates one
example we found. The screenshot was captured from the homepage of The Wall Street
Journal on Jan 14th, 2016. An image of Marco Rubio showed up before other content of
the webpage (shown in Figure 1.1 (a)), then his image faded out when the main content
of the webpage loaded (shown in Figure 1.1 (b)). The display duration of Marco Rubio
image was 50ms. The goals of our research are design security and privacy warnings
using subliminal priming and develop an advanced version of ETIA tool to verify the
display of subliminal primes and users’ attention on the area of subliminal primes.
This dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter provides related work
about computer warning models, dynamic warnings, and research of subliminal messages.
Chapter 3 introduces the LHBW model to organize and analyze the existing research on
computer warnings. In Chapter 4, we present an eye gaze based dynamic warning
approach, an experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of this approach, and the results of
the experiment. In Chapter 5, we discuss a study to investigate subliminal warnings and
attacks. We discuss an experiment which applied a subliminal stimulus in warnings and
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the result of the experiment. In Chapter 6, we conclude the dissertation and discuss
future work.

(a)

(b)

Figure 1.1 Screenshots of the Wall Street Journal webpage using subliminal stimuli.
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CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

Warnings encourage safe behaviors. Researchers have been working on warning
designs for decades. They find that users frequently ignore warnings and focus, instead,
on their task [6]. To understand how people process warning, several models were
developed such as the C-HIP model [19],the sequential model [20], and the levels of
performance model [21], etc. To increase the effectiveness of warnings, researchers and
warning designers have developed many approaches to attract users’ attention, to
communicate clearly about the risks, and to provide straightforward instructions for
avoiding the hazard [9], [19], [22]. One research project I worked on is related to
dynamic warnings, which are designed to improve the effectiveness of computer
warnings. The detail of dynamic warnings will be introduced in Chapter 4. Some idea of
the design and evaluation is inspired from current warning designs which I will discuss in
this chapter.
Subconscious level priming is not considered as an approach to improve computer
warnings. But it was used in other areas for years, such as advertising and educating [23]
[24]. A lot of research has been done on the effect of subconscious level priming on
human behavior [25]–[28].
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 provides a literature
review of related models for warning design. Section 2.2 discusses related works on
dynamic warnings. Section 2.3 describes research about subliminal priming.
2.1

Computer Warning Models
Warning models help to understand the process of warning messages, classify

warning designs, and guide development of safer products. For example, the sequential
model [20] is based on the idea that warnings are just another form of communication.
The sequential model includes the following stages: exposure to stimulus, message
perception, storage and retrieval of knowledge, decision-making, and ultimately a
response. The C-HIP model separates the warning process into two aspects of the
warning (i.e., source, channel) and six stages of human information processing: delivery,
attention switch, comprehension, attitudes and beliefs, motivation, and behavior [19].
Another popular model, the levels of performance model, analyzes human
behavior related to hazards involving complex systems [21]. It separates human behavior
in task performance into four levels: the skill-based level, the rule-based level, the
knowledge-based level, and the judgment-based level. It maps human behavior into each
level to guide the selection of appropriate warning strategies. The levels of performance
model provide a detailed analysis on different levels of human behavior.
The human-in-the-loop framework focuses on the understanding of security
problems that might arise from the interaction between humans and software systems
[29]. It provides a framework for security communications using computer devices and
describes warnings in four stages: communication, communication impediments, human
receiver, and behavior. Similar to the C-HIP model, the human-in-the-loop framework is
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a sequential model, which does not consider the feedback detail from decision-making to
long-term memory and all warning components.
Bravo-Lillo et al. proposed a model named the mental model. They conducted
interviews with advanced users in security and privacy and novice users. They
categorized and coded users’ answers and used these codes to create items in the mental
model diagram that illustrates the knowledge gap between normal users and security
experts. This mental model is a useful solution for more holistic warning design and for
making warnings more informative and less generic. However, this model may generate
too many items to analyze if more interviews are performed.
Warning components (such as signals, symbols and messages) are part of the
warning interface. The C-HIP model, the sequential model, and the human-in-the-loop
model are general models that do not separately discuss and evaluate the effectiveness of
warning components. The levels of performance model analyzes some warning
components at different levels. However, the levels of performance model does not
address human attention or memory retrieval and storage, which are critical parts in the
warning process. The leveled human behavior warning model (LBHW) that we propose
analyzes warning components at multiple levels. It focuses on attention, memory retrieval,
and storage at difference levels.
These models provide frameworks to understand the warning process in general.
The C-HIP model, the sequential model, and the levels of performance model are
normally used on industry products (e.g., warnings on product labels, road warning signs).
Some warning designs (such as pop-up dialogs, security indicators), typical in a computer
security context, are not addressed in these models at the level of specificity that would
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be helpful to computer warning designers. Those designers need a model that specifically
focuses on computer warnings and suggest how to optimize the design and the use of
computer security warnings.
2.2

Related Work for Dynamic Warnings
Warnings are widely used to prevent security and privacy attacks. Researchers

have developed several frameworks to model warning effectiveness [21][30][31]，as we
discussed in the previous subsection. Wogalter’s C-HIP model [32] is one of the most
widely used frameworks in warning design. It identifies nine phases of information
processing of warnings: warning source, channel, delivery, attention switch, attention
maintenance, comprehension, memory, motivation, and behavior. It starts with the source
by using a visual, tactile or auditory channel to deliver to receivers. Factors such as font
size, color, and audio volume in the warning stimuli have effects on behavior. As present
in the C-HIP model, attention switch, attention maintenance, and comprehension could
affect receivers’ behavior. In our study, we introduce a new warning system by
evaluating and optimizing information processing in these three levels.
Researchers found that four aspects of memory (semantic memory, episodic
memory, working memory and prospective memory), related to warning comprehension,
influence the effect of warnings [22]. A designer could use these aspects of memory to
improve textual and symbolic warning stimuli. Semantic memory is organized
knowledge that a person possesses about words, symbols, and images. Meaning and
referents, rules, formulas and algorithms for the manipulation of these words, symbols or
images stored in semantic memory [33]. To trigger semantic memory, a warning with
symbols or images familiar to users will help them understand the warning message.
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Microsoft Windows warnings have been used in Windows products for many
years. A warning message in Windows could be a dialog box (requiring users to close the
dialog box before continuing with the task window), an in-place message (appearing in
the context of the current user interface (UI) surface), a banner (showing up when a user
is trying to complete a task), a notification (not requiring immediate user action), or a
balloon (a small pop-up window informing users of a non-critical problem or special
condition in a control) [34]. Windows programs display warnings from critical to less
critical [34].
“Overwarning” may be inefficient [34]. When an individual habituate to warnings,
she may not acquire any or all of the information from the warning. Kim and Wogalter
mentioned four solutions to deal with the problem of habituation [35]. First, incorporate
features (e.g., size and color) to enhance conspicuity. Second, modify or change the
warning’s appearance. Third, allow warning designers to deviate from the standards, such
as ANSI standard and Microsoft warning standards. Fourth, use dynamic (changeable)
warnings. We have taken this fourth approach. According to research by Racicot and
Wogalter [36], in the workplace and in hazardous environments, warnings should be
presented only when the risk information is needed. Highly sophisticated detection and
warning systems could also enable personalization of the sign and varied presentation
patterns that will prevent or delay habituation [37].
Dynamic warnings are more noticeable than static warnings [38]. Because
dynamic aspects of warnings should be conspicuous to attract and sustain attention, they
could reduce the problem of habituation. If the warning is presented proximally distant
from the hazard, in terms of location and time, people may not recognize the connection
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or may not remember the hazard. By working with detectors or sensing devices, the
dynamic warning can be displayed when a warning is needed [39][40].
Physical security metaphors could provide a vivid image to inform users about
hazards. Our warning design is inspired by previous research on physical security
metaphor images used on security-related warnings. Raja and colleagues designed
firewall warnings whose functionality was based on a physical security metaphor (a
figure dressed in a prisoner’s uniform, carrying a knife and a thief’s bag) [12]. Their
warnings facilitated the comprehension of warning information, better communicated the
risk, and increased the likelihood of safe behavior. Sunshine and Egelman redesigned
SSL warnings. Their severe warning had a red background and a “Stop sign officer”
security metaphor [1]. Also, research on eye movement suggests that pictorial color icons
were more effective than the ones without a pictorial icon or a color icon [41]. Our
dynamic warning uses a similar iconic metaphor to increase comprehension.
Eye tracking technology has been used to improve the design of human–computer
interaction (HCI). Jones and Milton (1950) captured eye movements with cockpitmounted mirrors and movie cameras to study eye movement data with painstaking frameby-frame analysis of the pilot’s face [42]. Crowe and Nrayanan emphasized that
aggregating, analyzing, and visualizing eye tracking data in conjunction with other
interaction data could be a powerful tool for designers and experimenters in evaluating
interfaces [43]. Nielsen and Pernice used eye tracking on web usability to discover
usability guidelines for Web sites, intranets, social network postings and e-mail
newsletters [44]. Frey and colleagues conducted an experiment using the Eye-FixationRelated Potentials technique and found specific patterns of brain signals in parietal and
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occipital areas, spreading out on the next words following the goal word and the second
fixation after an incongruent word [45]. Takeuchi and colleagues measured participants’
pupil diameters with an infrared-video-based eye-tracking device and found that pupil
size increased rapidly as the learning proceeded in the early phase of training and
decreased at the later phase to a level half of its maximum value [46]. In recent years,
researchers started to use eye movement as an input in HCI systems. For example, Jacob
applied eye movement for object selection, using eye movement to control both scrolling
text and defining a “listener” window [47]. Our dynamic warning system uses such an
eye gaze information analysis method to trigger when warnings appear and fade.
2.3

Research on Subliminal Messages
To what extent can non-conscious perception affect our behaviors? This has been

one of the most controversial issues in psychology. Researchers addressed this issue
through experiments that use subliminal stimulation methods [25]–[28]. A subliminal
stimulus is presented below a threshold for conscious perception. Subliminal perception
is inferred when a stimulus is demonstrated to be not consciously perceived, while still
influencing thoughts, feelings, actions, learning or memory [48]. Three models could be
applied for subliminal priming: subliminal priming mapping with response, priming by
spatial attention and priming by strategies.
Studies showed that arbitrary stimulus–response mappings can apply to
subliminal stimuli [49]–[52]. The stimulus-response mapping is a strategy to generate a
connection between a response and a stimulus. The goal of stimulus-response mapping is
to encourage a response then a stimulus displayed. Stimuli presented below the threshold
of awareness can systematically influence choice responses determined by the instructed
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stimulus–response (S–R) mapping. Researchers investigated whether such stimuli would
influence a free choice between two response alternatives under conditions in which the
choice subjectively appears to be internally generated and free. For example, the primes
were left- and right-pointing double arrows (<< and >>). The choices provided were
either left- and right-pointing double arrows or outward-pointing double arrows (< >).
The experimental results demonstrated that apparently “free” choices are not immune to
not consciously triggered biases [51] (for example, the participants were tend to choose
left-pointing arrows if left-arrows were displayed as a subliminal prime). Greenwald and
Draine conducted 3 experiments to test the S-R subliminal stimuli. They found that
participants’ responses were affected by the subliminal stimuli LEFT and RIGH
(shortened from RIGHT). Results indicated that subliminal stimuli, even when unnoticed,
influenced consciously guided performance [53]. We are applying S-R mapping in
subliminal messages and icon design.
Subliminal messages have been used in advertising for decades to influence
purchase behavior. Subliminal advertising became notorious in 1957 through the
publicity. James Vicary, a private market researcher claimed to have substantially
increased sales of Coca Cola and popcorn in a movie theatre by secretly and subliminally
flashing the message “Drink Coca Cola” and “Eat popcorn” [54]. After that, other
researchers demonstrated that subliminal priming of a brand name of drink positively
affected participants’ choice and their intention, the primed brand, but only for
participants who were thirsty [23][51]. Subliminal messages had also been applied in
educational areas to improve academic performance [24]. For example, subliminal words
were randomly displayed in different locations of slides presented to students [24].
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Subliminal primes also led to more betting and confidence. For participants playing a
computerized slot machine game. A subliminal “jackpot” prime repeatedly flashed during
preliminary play [55].
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CHAPTER 3

THE LEVELED HUMAN BEHAVIOR WARNING MODEL

A warning processing model may be used as a framework to analyze computer
warnings and guide computer designers and developers. The model of the warning
process should include presentations of warning components, individuals’ attention,
memory, decision-making, and hopefully the behavior. Researchers have developed
several frameworks, such as the sequential model [21], the Communication-Human
Information Processing (C-HIP) model [15], and the levels of performance model [22].
These models could help designers understand how people process and respond to
warnings. These models, however, did not evaluate how different warning components,
such as symbols, signs, and messages, influence the effectiveness of warnings, although
warning designers desire to know how to improve specific components of their warnings.
For example, a warning with a symbol and lines of messages is commonly ignored by
users. A designer may want to know which part of the warning (the symbol, the message
or both) needs to be improved and how to improve it. Existing frameworks do not
separately discuss how people process these components and provide suggestions to
improve them. Input and output specialized for computer warnings, such as mouse
movement, keyboard input and pop up dialogs, are not considered by the existing
frameworks. Computer warning designers need a framework that provides detailed
guidance specifically based on computer warning processes.
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With the significance of a warning framework, and the limitations of current
warning frameworks in mind, we propose a framework named the Leveled Human
Behavior Warning (LHBW) model. Based on our LHBW model, we group computer
warning designs and evaluations into five levels: warning stimuli, warning perception,
warning storage and memory retrieval, decision-making, and behavior. At each level, we
classify and analyze current warnings designs. The model describes the stages of human
processing computer security warning and can be used as a guideline for warning
countermeasures research on security attacks. It provides suggestions to improve
different computer warning components. Human processing of warning symbols, signals
and messages are separately discussed in terms of warning stimuli level and decisionmaking levels. Based on our LHBW model and taxonomy, we analyze existing warning
approaches including warning stimuli, perception factors, aspects of long-term memory,
decision-making, and types of warnings.
3.1

The Leveled Human Behavior Warning Model
The LHBW model focuses on computer warnings. We will discuss the warning

components design and effects. The basic LHBW model is shown in Figure 3.1 There are
five levels in LHBW: warning stimuli, warning perception, warning storage and memory
retrieval, decision-making, and behavior. We will analyze interactions between memory
retrieval, warning storage and decision-making process. We will also provide
classification and optimization suggestions of warnings designs at each level.
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Figure 3.1 Leveled Human Behavior Warning Model.
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3.1.1

Warning Stimuli
The warning stimuli are the initial transmitters of the warning information.

According to C-HIP model [19], a warning delivered to a receiver is based on two
essential aspects – the sensory modalities through which a warning is sent and the
interface a warning represents. We differentiate the components by which the warning is
displayed on the warning interface into symbol, message and signal. Figure 3.2 illustrates
the taxonomy in the warning stimuli level. Table 3-1 provides a classification of warning
design research on warning stimuli level. The examples in Table 3-1 show warning
stimuli researchers have used.
Warning Stimuli

Warning Sensory Modalities

Visual

Auditory

Warning Components

Tactile

Symbol

Message

Signal

Figure 3.2 Warning stimuli level.

Warning Sensory Modalities

In computer warnings, three types of sensory stimuli - visual, audio, and tactile may be used. They are limited compared to traditional industry areas. Visual stimuli such
as warning labels, warning dialog boxes or colored icons are commonly employed.
Auditory stimuli could be a “water drop” sound to reveal a location [11] or any
semantically meaningful messages [56]. Tactile sensory stimuli are normally represent by
signals such as vibrations of a phone [57]. Often, using multiple sensory modalities to
convey warning information is better than a single sensory modality [58].
19

Table 3-1 A classification of warning stimuli with examples.
Tactile

Symbol
-

Message
-

Auditory

-

Visual

Pictorial metaphors such as
“a police officer” [12], [61],
[62], [81], [130], [131];
Icons such as a triangle icon
with an exclamation mark in
the middle, or
a green lock icon before
URL in a browser to indicate
validate SSL certificate [60],
[74], [132]–[135].

Semantically
meaningful warning
message such as
“Bob is checking
your location.” [56],
[58], [126], [127]
Semantically
meaningful warning
messages such like
“unprotected form”
[34], [41], [58], [75],
[136]–[138],

Signal
Vibration warning on
mobile devices [56], [57],
[124], [125]
Short warning sound such
as “water drop” [126],
[128], [129]

Signals such as a flashing
red dot [83], [139];
Signal word such as
“WARNING” or “HAZARD”
[66], [67], [140].

Warning Components

A warning may consist of three types of components: symbols, messages and
signals. Warning symbols include signs, icons and pictorial metaphors. Symbols, icons
and graphics can reduce intercultural differences in understanding warnings and increase
comprehension and memory [59]. A warning that includes an icon is more noticeable
[60]. Providing both symbols and text improves memory and increases salience [61].
Microsoft provides suggestions on warning icons and severity levels [34]. Recently,
pictorial metaphors have been added into some warning panels. Pictorial metaphors are
more complex than signs or icons. They are distinguished from text and support text. For
example, researchers designed a physical security metaphor in firewall warnings [12],
using the image of man standing outside a house door. The metaphor indicates a
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malicious situation; the man is a thief with a knife in his left hand and a bag with the
word “data” in this right hand [12]. The SSL warning uses a “Stop sign officer” physical
security metaphor. It is used in Mozilla Firefox in severe security situations [6]. As
another example, Schlegel and Kapadia use the visual metaphor of eyes to show users
their level of exposure [62].
Warning message contents and meanings are the two most emphasized warning
issues [20]. Several models address important aspects of these issues. Linguistic
modeling provides a guideline on how to design effective semantics, syntax, and context
within warnings [63]. A large number of studies on linguistic modeling have shown that
semantics, syntax, and context are all potentially important determinants of whether
people will understand a particular warning message [64]. Several computer tools may
help writers improve the understandability of written text. These tools include readability
indexes and grammar checkers. Studies have found that providing more explicit or
detailed information in the warning message or label increases warning effectiveness [65].
Short sentences using short words score better on the readability indexes [63].
The forms of warning signals are simpler than warning symbols. Warning signals
are used to assist warning message and symbols. Signals are meaningless without
warning messages or symbols if no training or information are provided in the beginning.
Auditory signals such as a beep sound, visual signals such as a red or yellow dot, and
tactile signals such as a vibration are used to gain attention. Warnings with signal words
could convey redundant information about the level of hazard associated with a sign [66].
For example, warnings with a signal word “hazard” were significantly more effective in
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reducing identity disclosure than warnings containing “caution” or “warning” in the
message [67].
Font type, weight and size may influence warnings’ effectiveness. Helvetica type,
for instance, is perceived to be more readable than Times or Goudy [68]. Bold type is
perceived to be more readable than not bold type. Point size contrast between the signal
word and the main body of the warning will increase salience of the signal word [69]. A
bypass choice (such as a link to close a warning) could be formatted into a smaller size to
reduce the salience of it [1].
3.1.2

Warning Perception
When people are exposed to stimuli, their attention will be divided by various

stimuli and events [14]. People’s attention is limited to process these stimuli [70].
According to research on human information processing [21], most of the incoming
sensory data are filtered out at an early stage in the perceptual process.
In models of effective warnings, the warning perception level includes two stages,
attention switch and attention maintenance (shown in Figure 3.1). People’s attention will
be attracted or switched to the most salient stimulus, and attention will be focused on that
stimulus. To attract attention, warnings need to be well-designed. To reduce attention
switch away from a warning, designers may apply some techniques to hold a user’s
attention until pertinent information is extracted from the warning, is encoded, and forms
a memory. The spatial, temporal and chromatic features shown in Figure 3.3 may be able
to influence the efficiency of warnings at the perception level. Table 3-2 provides a
classification of warning research at the warning perception level. The examples in Table
3-2 show designs that researchers have developed to attract and maintain users’ attention.
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Warning Perception
Factors

Spatial Features

Temporal Features

Layout and
format

Warning Size

Flashing

Location

Borders

Repeated
Exposure

Display condition and context

Chromatic Features

Color Contrast
Brightness
Contrast

Duration

Figure 3.3 Warning perception factors.
Spatial Features

Spatial features such as layout, size, location, borders, and display context
conditions are main factors for the warning’s noticeability. Designers could optimize
these features to help warnings stand out from display noises and extend people’s
attention on the critical parts of warnings.
•

Layout and format: Hierarchically organized warnings, which sequentially
present hazards’ consequences and instructions, are more effective [71]. For
instance, SSL warnings could be designed to present in multiple pages, and have
the “continue” option only on the first page [1]. Links with messages “Get me out
of here” and “Why is this site blocked?” could be designed to be more noticeable.
SSL warning bypass options could be hidden under an “I know what I’m doing"
option if users want to bypass the SSL warning [72]. Researchers suggest that the
layout and format of warnings should be consistent [73]. For example, consistent
security icons across browsers may help users understand the icons even they are
using a new browser [74].
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Table 3-2 A classification on warning perception factors with examples.
Layout and
format

Warning Size
Spatial
Features

Location

Borders
Display
condition
and context
Flashing

Temporal
Features

Repeated
Exposure

Duration

Chromatic
Features

Color
contrast
Brightness
contrast

•

Use a hierarchical layout such as showing messages by bullets
[11], [59], [71], [72], [141], [142];
Using a consistent layout such as security icons consistent
across browsers [1], [6], [74].
Use large warnings with constraints, such as the size of a
warning at a browser’s task bar is restricted by the size of
browser task bar [14], [75].
Show warnings close to hazards [76], [77], such as a warning
shows up beside data entry textbox to prevent people from
identity disclosure [13], [67];
A red dot with a cross mark shows up next to username and
password for insecure login [78].
A warning with thick border is more salient than no border
[13], [67], [79], [81], [143].
A warning with irrelevant pictorials and icons reduces its
salience [80], [81].
Use flashing lights to indicate hazards such as low-battery or
disk drive unit overheating [84]–[87].
Use the same warnings for the same hazards such as the
same warnings showing up every time a user fetches content
from an insecure resource [10], [13], [35], [89].
Use an appropriate display duration [10], [35], [108], such as
a notification pop-up displaying a few lines of text in the
bottom of the screen which disappears automatically after 2
seconds [56].
Use appropriate background for different levels of severity
[10], [13], [72], [90], such as the use of yellow background for
downloading from unknown sources or using red background
for visiting malicious websites [144].
Increase brightness of warning while decreasing brightness of
other display [41], [91].

Warning size: Warnings with large size are generally more desirable [14]. But
they should be designed within existing constraints (such as the textbox size, or
warning standards). For example, a warning in a browser’s task bar should not
larger than the size of the task bar [75].
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•

Location: The placement of a warning influences its effectiveness. Warnings
should be temporarily displayed with working task [76]. Furthermore, warnings
should be displayed with spatial proximity to the hazard [77]. Researchers have
found that warnings are more efficient if they are placed in the top half of the
home page or when they provide a conspicuous link to the information [69]. A
browser warning helps users identify a fraudulent website by putting warning
dialogs beside the place where users enter data [13]. A red dot with a cross mark
placed at the right-side of username and password textbox may prevent insecure
login [78].

•

Borders: Placing a border around important safety information is a way to make a
warning stand out from its background. Certain border conditions (thick, colored
diagonal stripes) are rated as more attention-getting than other border conditions
(no border or a thin black line border) [79]. For example, Maurer and colleagues
used a red-bordered warning to protect users from disclose identity information to
fraudulent websites [13].

•

Display conditions and context: People are distracted from warnings as
workload increases [80]. Display distractions, either within the warning display
area or in the broader context of the user, such as flashing advertisements,
pictorials and icons, reduces warnings’ salience [81]. In this case, approaches are
useful if they direct people’s attention back to the warning message when they are
distracted.
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Temporal Features

When, how long, and how many times warnings are displayed are the questions
designers must ask themselves before they release their software products. These
temporal features need to be well designed to attract attention, increase attention duration
and decrease habituation effects.
•

Flashing: Flashing stimuli attract attention better than continuous or static
indicator stimuli [82]. They also attract attention from a distance [83]. Flashing
pop-up 4 Hz for small symbols and icons, and 2 Hz for large text blocks are
recommended [84]. Researchers have used flashing lights to remind users of a
low-battery or of disk drive unit overheating [85], [86]. Some malicious websites
use flashing popup warning windows to attract users’ attention [87]. Chan and
colleagues have suggested that a red flashing light is more effective compared to
yellow or blue warning lights [83].

•

Repeated Exposure: Repeated exposure of the same warning may attract
attention and prevent dangerous behavior [88]. For example, Internet Explorer
shows the same warning dialog every time when a secure website is visited that
fetches content (like ads) from another insecure server [13]. Cristian and Lorrie
designed a security warning which first hides the contents of the salient field, then
progressively animates it back into place over a period of four seconds [10]. Too
many repeated and long duration exposures of a warning may result, however, in
a loss of attention [10], [35], [89]. This process is called habituation which we
will discuss in section 3.3.

•

Duration: “Show-up duration” starts from the time when the warnings appear to
receivers and ends when the warnings fade out or users close them. The “show-up
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duration” may help to hold attention. Over time, however, exposure can make
warnings appear dull and become less noticeable [35] . Bravo-Lillo and Cranor
have developed a swipe attractor, which requires users to move their mouse over
the key field [10]. This approach expands the durability of users’ attention on the
warning.
Chromatic Features

Optimizing the features related to color could elicit a switch of attention to
warnings by increasing their salience. These chromatic optimizations include adjusting
the brightness and color contrast of different part of warnings.
•

Color contrast: Researchers have shown that warnings in the red, yellow, orange
background are more effective than white background [72]. A guide for
Federation Internet Alert suggests that the main warning text should be presented
as solid, in pure white against a solid red background [90]. As instances, Google
Chrome and Mozilla Firefox Malware warnings are designed in a red background
[6]. Highlighting the critical parts of a warning may help the warning stand out.
But too much highlighting reduces the salience [14]. Bravo-Lillo and Cranor
designed a yellow highlight that appears behind keywords to capture users’
attention. In a set of security decision user interfaces, Bravo-Lillo and Cranor’s
design makes genuine risks harder to ignore [10].

•

Brightness contrast: Warning components with greater brightness contrast are
detected faster than those of lower brightness contrast [91]. In this case, reduce
the brightness of the area of the screen except the warning area may increase the
effectiveness of warnings.
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3.1.3

Warning Storage and Memory Retrieval
Memories are formed based on stimuli that attract and hold attention. People

comprehend signals, symbols and messages of warnings based on previous knowledge in
their memory. They make decisions based on their comprehension of the warning. Their
decisions of current hazards and warnings are stored in memory, too. Thus, warnings
have an impact in memory for further decisions. When designers understand how textual
and symbolic warning stimuli influence working memory, and utilize it, the positive
impacts of warnings could be increased. We separate the memory retrieval and storage
level into two aspects, long-term memory and short-term memory. Figure 3.4 shows the
taxonomy of memory related to warning memory retrieval and storage. Table 3-3
provides more detailed information about storage and memory retrieval. Examples in
Table 3-3 show designs that trigger or make use of corresponding memory
Warning Storage and
Memory Retrieval
Short-term
memory

Working
memory

Long-term
memory

Semantic
memory

Episodic
memory

Figure 3.4 Warning storage and memory retrieval.
.
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Table 3-3 A classification of warning storage and memory retrieval with examples.
Related Memory
Aspects

Warning Design Approaches

Working Memory

A warning should include less than five chunks of information
[93];
A warning shows up when a user starts to type in identity
information [13].

Semantic Memory

Use pictorial security metaphors, such as “a police officer”, or “a
prisoner carrying a knife and a bag” [1], [6], [12], [62].

Episodic Memory

Use warning dialogs with the same symbol, format, layout and
background for a class of products across instances of use [33],
[133], [145].

Short-term memory holds a small amount of information for a short period of time. Items
are kept in short-term memory for 15 to 30 seconds [92]. Working memory involves
both the short term storage of information as well as the concomitant active processing of
other information [22]. Similarly, people can maintain only four or five chunks of
information in working memory [41], [93]. A warning should therefore include, at most,
five chunks of information. To make use of working memory, a warning should appear
“at the right time” to help users understand the current working task is dangerous. For
example, a warning message, “You are about to transfer personal data. Are you sure you
want to trust this site?” should appear when user is trying to input their identity
information on a malicious website [13].
Long-term memory stores information over a longer period of time. Short-term
memories can become long-term memories through the process of consolidation [94].
Two aspects of memory are related to long-term memory in warning processes. They are
semantic memory and episodic memory. Semantic memory refers to an individual’s
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general knowledge about the world, including domain knowledge, schemas, and scripts
[22]. The more knowledge an individual retains in semantic memory about a warning, the
less effort he needs for processing the warning, and the warning will be more effective
for the individual. Bowles and colleagues suggested images could be used to help people
retrieve relevant knowledge from semantic memory [95]. Pictorial stimuli that are vivid
enough could remind users of a familiar hazard that individuals encountered before. For
example, Raja and colleagues used a warning dialog with a figure dressed in a prisoner’s
uniform, carrying a knife and a thief’s bag [12]. The warning reminds users they are
connecting to a dangerous server. Schlegel and colleagues used a visual metaphor of eyes
appearing and growing in size on the smartphone home screen. The “eyes” remind users
someone is accessing their location [62]. Episodic memory refers to the memories of
events that people have personally experienced during their lifetime [22]. There are
several ways to make warnings more effective based on episodic memory, such as using
some context and format that users may have previously encountered. Designers may use
similar warnings for a class of products across instances of use. An appropriate reminder
warning should be provided to help retrieve the long-term memories of the task, if the
specific details of complex warnings are not present at the time of product operation.
3.1.4

Decision-making
Decision-making and memory retrieval are two levels that influence each other.

Comprehension of warnings is influenced by previous decisions on the similar warning
components. The decision for a particular warning may be stored in long-term memory.
The decision-making level is inspired from the levels of the performance model [21]. In
this paper, our analyses assume that computer warnings are being displayed to unskilled
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non-expert users. We removed the skill-based level from the levels of performance model.
We designed three types of decision-making and response selection methods (judgmentbased decision-making, knowledge-based decision-making, and rule-based decisionmaking as shown in Figure 3.5). Table 3-4 provides a classification of research on
warning decision-making level. Examples in Table 3-4 show examples of warning
designs following the decision-making procedures.
Warning decision making

Judgmentbased

Knowledgebased

Rule-based

Figure 3.5 Warning decision-making.

Table 3-4 A classification of warning decision-making.
Related Decisionmaking Procedures

Warning Design Approaches

Judgment-based

Use short and simple warning messages, such as “This type of file
can harm your computer. Are you sure you want to download?”
[96]–[100].

Knowledge-based

A warning using vibration or a LED flashing light on mobile
devices to indicate users sending data unencrypted to an
unknown server [11], [12], [56], [101], [102].

Rule-based

Use symbols such as a yellow triangle with an exclamation mark
to indicate a site with an untrusted security certificate [103],
[105], [144].
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Figure 3.6 shows the judgment-based decision-making procedure. Warning
messages retrieved from working memory include more words and information than
signals and symbols. Users understand the problem underlying a warning based on
information from the messages. Krol and colleagues conducted a study on pdf download
warnings [96]. They found that some participants reported they ignored the warning
message because they thought they recognized security risks. Post-experiment
questionnaire responses revealed their misunderstanding about security threats.
Researchers found that misunderstandings about threats led users to believe that warnings
did not apply to them [97]. Judgment-based decisions involve users’ agreement and

Figure 3.6 Judgment-based decision-making.

disagreement of warning messages and tradeoffs if they comply. Personal opinions,
attitudes, and beliefs may affect this process-providing information retrieved from longterm memory and may produce emotional reactions. Researchers found that attitudes and
beliefs are more important factors than understanding of the warnings [98]. Influenced by
the affective reactions, users assign priorities to goals. They evaluate cost-benefit
tradeoffs of understand and follow the warning advice [99]. To improve warnings at this
level, studies suggest that warnings should not include complex and long messages [99].
The goal is to change users’ attitudes and beliefs. Studies have shown that warnings can
modify attitudes and beliefs when people are not familiar with a product and when they
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experience significant events that make them feel unsafe. Judgments about warnings can
be cognitive and not just affective [100].
For knowledge-based decision-making, symbols and signals from the context are
retrieved from short-term memory. People search long-term memory to access similar
symbols and related events. If they believe that they are in an unfamiliar situation, their
decision-making will be knowledge-based [101]. Knowledge-based decision-making is a
learning process (Figure 3.7). Explicit information is required to form the connection
between these symbols or signals and current environmental state (hazards). For example,
researchers use vibration or a LED flashing light on mobile devices to indicate that users
are sending data unencrypted to an unknown server [102]. Messages describing the
hazard are displayed with the vibration or flashing light. Otherwise, users will be
confused between incoming phone calls and the security related situation. Hazards are
identified, and sequences of actions are planned. But errors may happen even though
users understand the warning message. Errors, here, mean inappropriate decisions related
to the current hazard. Pictorial metaphors depicting a similar hazard could activate some
semantic memory to help users reduce errors [21]. For example, an image with a thief
may remind users to be careful of system fire-wall errors [12].

Figure 3.7 Knowledge-based decision-making.
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Rule-based decision-making is a procedure that can be viewed as the sequential
cueing of responses from long-term memory (Figure 3.8). In rule-based decision-making,
signals and symbols are recognized. That is individuals may identify similar signals and
symbols from their long-term memory. An association between recognized symbols and
related hazards will be set up in receivers' minds. For example, researchers use symbol
such as a yellow triangle with an exclamation mark or a red hexagon with a cross mark to
indicate a site with an untrusted security certificate [103]. These icons have been widely
used in warnings beyond computer security [104]. If users are familiar with these icons,
they will realize the dangerous situation. After seeing the warnings, people apply rules to
make decisions and select related actions. As noted by Lehto, a critical characteristic of
the most rule-based tasks is the recognition of environmental states (hazards) and the
association of the rules with these states [21]. Errors at this aspect often correspond to
misunderstanding of signals and symbols. Often, people think they are familiar with the
symbols and then apply rules. The warning symbols and signals, however, may be
describing a different hazard. Thus, actions people perform based on the rules are not
appropriate to the current situation.
When a warning is presented, people must gather, organize and combine
information from different sensory modalities in different processing levels to make
decisions that direct their next behavior.

Figure 3.8 Rule-based decision-making.
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3.1.5

Behavior
The last stage in decision-making is action. People may be persuaded by warnings.

Alternatively, they may accomplish their goals to complete the working task and ignore
warnings. The goal of warning designers is to increase the warning-directed safe behavior.
To evaluate users’ behavior, the most commonly used approach is questions in postquestionnaires such as “Did you follow the warning suggestions?” or “Did you exposed
your private information?” This kind of evaluation is qualitative and subjective. There
are several quantitative measurements to better evaluate the effectiveness of warnings
based on a receiver's behavior. Click-through rate describes the proportion of users who
“closed” an active warning and continue the working task with potential danger. Time
spent on a warning describes the duration users’ attention focuses on it. For an active
warning, the time spent on warnings begins as soon as a warning is presented to receivers
and ends when they bypass an active warning [3]. For passive warnings, time spent on
warnings could be measured by the longest gaze duration on warnings, which could be
detected by eye tracking technologies.
Active warnings are defined as a warnings forcibly directing user’s attention by
requiring some action before users can by-pass the warnings [105]. An active warning
displays a dialog box which requires users to click (e.g., a “close” button) before they can
proceed to the next step. Researchers at CMU designed a SSL warning with two buttons
“Get me out of here” and “Why was this site blocked?” and a link “Ignore this warning.”
Users could only continue browsing by clicking one of three abovementioned choices [1].
As another example, a URL-based active warning was designed to show up when user
browsed a phishing website. Users could only continue browsing the website by clicking
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a Yes or No button for a message “Internet security experts believe that this page is part
of a fraudulent site. Are you sure you still want to visit this page?”[106].
Too many active warnings will bother users. Studies [107] noted that whether or
not a user will ultimately comply with a warning is strongly related to the cost (i.e., time,
effort, discomfort, and financial expense). Users often tend to bypass the warnings
without reading them carefully. If they focus on their current tasks, they prefer a warning
that does not interrupt their ongoing tasks. Passive warnings do not interrupt users’
ongoing tasks. An example of passive warning is a balloon with some warning
information that fades out automatically. Researchers in Intel Labs developed a system
named Wi-Fi Privacy Ticker [108]. It is a passive notification that sits above the user’s
task bar and displays information about the exposure of sensitive terms. Another example
is a notification bar or a balloon which a small pop-up at the top or bottom part of the
screen to alert a real-timer location sharing event [56]. A notification bar is a passive
warning approach, if it disappears automatically after a few seconds. Internet Explorer 9
allows notification bars, located at the bottom of the browser frame, to consolidate error
or warning messages. In most cases, designers should use active warnings for critical
notifications and passive warnings for non-critical situations. Table 3-5 provides a
classification and examples of active warnings and passive warnings.
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Table 3-5 A classification and examples of active warnings and passive warnings.
Warning category

3.2

Examples

Active Warning

Warnings with buttons or links to interrupt a current task [1],
[12], [67], [72], [105], [106], [144], [146], such as a warning with
two buttons “Get me out of here” and “Why was this site
blocked?”.

Passive Warning

Warnings not forcing users to take actions [56], [108], such as a
balloon warnings that pop-up and then fade out after 5 seconds.

Warning Design Analysis Based on the LHBW Model
Researchers and software developers have designed various warning approaches

for websites and applications on PCs and mobile devices to enhance warning
effectiveness. In the previous section, we provided classifications of these warning
approaches in each level of LHBW model. When users notice a warning, the processing
procedure involves not only one, but all levels in LHBW model. In this section, we
analyze warning designs by applying all five levels of the LHBW model (shown in Table
3-6). It depicts related warning stimuli, perception factors, related aspects of long-term
memory, the dominating decision-making, and behavior. Table 3-6 also provides
examples to analysis computer warning designs using the whole process of LHBW model.
A dialog box is the most commonly used warning approach in computing
environments. Dialog boxes pop up when hazards occur. The simplest dialog box consists
of a message and a commit button. Dialog boxes could also include detailed instructions
and symbols. Decision-making procedures for dialog boxes start at the judgment-based
decision-making level. To process a hazard described in a dialog box, semantic memories
and episodic memories are retrieved from long-term memory. Dialog box warnings are
categorized as active warnings. To be better perceived, we suggest the dialog box be
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Table 3-6 An analysis of warning approaches using the LHBW model.
Approaches

Warning
Stimuli

A dialog box shows a message, symbols and Visual
buttons. It notifies a user a security hazard Message/
[13], [56], [106].
Symbol
A warning hides the choice of bypass the
Visual
warning [1], [72].
Messages
A warning with Red/yellow/orange
Visual
background color [1], [9], [72].
Signals
Warning key word (HAZARD) in bold font
Visual
and underlined [67].
Signals
Actions are required before closing a
Visual
warning. Such as users are required to type Signals
key words into a textbox before close a
warning [10].
A warning shows a pictorial security
Visual
metaphor such as a theft [12], [62].
Symbols
A notification bar pop-up when a security
hazard needs to be considered. It
automatically disappears after 2 seconds
[108].
Security Toolbar embeds on the top of a
browser [106].
Vibration [56]
Warning sound such as beep sound or "You
got a message." [56]
Flashing light [56], [102]

Perception
Long-term
Factors
Memory Type

Decisionmaking
Base

Active or
Passive
Warning

Spatial
Temporal
Chromatic
Spatial

Semantic/
Episodic

Judgment

Active

N/A

Judgment

Active

Chromatic

N/A

Rule

Spatial

Semantic

Temporal

Semantic

Rule/
Knowledge
Rule/
Knowledge

Active/
Passive
Active/
Passive
Active

N/A

Semantic

Knowledge

Active/
Passive

Semantic/
Episodic

Judgment/
Rule

Passive

Visual
Spatial
Messages/S Temporal
ignals
Visual
Symbols

Spatial

Semantic

Rule

Passive

Tactile
Signals

Temporal

Episodic

Rule

Passive

Auditory
Signals

Temporal

Semantic/
Episodic

Rule

Passive

Visual
Signals

Temporal

Semantic/
Episodic

Rule

Passive

located temporally and spatially close to hazards. For example, to alert users not to input
private information on a website, a warning dialog box can be spatially close to the input
text box and right before a user’s input (temporally close)[13]. We suggest that the
location of a dialog box is consistent, if so, the content might be more easily retrieved
from long-term memory.
Warning perception features may be improved to make them more effective.
Dialog boxes could be optimized at the perception level by changing the location or font
size of commit buttons and by hiding bypass choices [1], [72]. Developers can change
background colors to optimize attention switch toward warnings, which could apply to
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both active and passive warnings [1], [9], [72]. For most individuals, different color
signals in long-term memory are mapped to different levels of danger. The color signals
should match the levels of dangers (e.g., red for most severe, yellow for less severe). This
signal processing process is considered as rule-based decision-making for individuals
who have already formed this mapping in their mind.
Keywords are critical component in warning messages. Semantic memory is
needed to retrieve and understand the keywords. If the key words are general, such as
“warning”,” hazard,” or “danger,” decision-making is rule-based or knowledge-based.
Keywords should be highlighted for attention. Highlighting techniques, as described in
the perception level, have positive effects on users’ attention. To increase the duration of
users attention on key words, an active warning may be used to require users’ actions,
such as typing in the key words or moving the mouse over the key words [10].
Warnings with physical security metaphors provide a vivid image to inform users
of the severity of hazards [1], [6], [12], [62]. This approach often provides optimization
on warning symbols. They may trigger sematic memories to aid understanding the hazard.
If these physical security metaphors appear new and interesting in the computer context,
decision-making is knowledge-based. Errors implied by knowledge-based decisionmaking can be reduced if the content of the physical security metaphors matches the
information about the similar situation that stored in user’s semantic long-term memory.
A notification bar should be located temporally and spatially close to the current
task to get attention. The duration time should be carefully assigned. Short-duration times
may not be able to grab attention, but long duration times may lead to habituation or
undue task interruption. The best duration time should start from when hazards are
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present and end when users finish their reading on warning messages. The temporarily
and spatial location requirements aid mapping between the show up of notification and a
dangerous event formed in long-term memory. Judgment-based decision-making and
rule-based decision-making are both engaged in this case. Notification bars should
include less information than dialog boxes because of the space limitation. Signals like
warning sound, vibration, or flashing light could be combined with the pop-up
notification bar.
Security toolbars (such as TrustBar or Netcraft Toolbar) embedded in web
browsers show security-related information about a website [75], [109], [110]. It is a
common passive solution against phishing attacks. Security toolbars do not work well
according to recent research [106]. Even though users were asked to pay attention to the
toolbar, many failed to look at it. Others disregarded or explained away the toolbars’
warnings if the content of web pages looked legitimate [106]. Typically, security toolbars
contain symbols only. Semantic memories are retrieved to make associations with a
hazard. Rule-base decision-making is engaged in security toolbars' processing in the
human mind. Symbols in security toolbars have to be familiar to users, otherwise, they
are meaningless. Designers should be careful how they display these security symbols.
Too frequent displays may lead to habituation problems.
Smart phone applications use vibrations to alert or notify users to some real-time
events. Vibration is used as an assistant tactile signal in the warnings system. For
example, it is used to indicate a real-time location checking event [11]. Similarly, the
purpose of temporal requirement of the vibration signal is to form appropriate short-term
memory about the event. This is also a rule-based decision-making procedure. If the
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association between the event and vibration is not established, the vibration is not helpful
in decision-making. A vibration warning signal should happen temporally and close to
the event (in 20 seconds). Otherwise, users may be confused.
Sound incorporated in warnings could be represented as a distinct tone playing
when a hazardous event occurs, such as a beeping sound. A audio warning can be fully
descriptive natural language [56], such as “You have a warning message.” Audio
warnings are used in various occasions. Users’ judgment on the urgency of a sound
warning could be affected by some acoustic parameters such as inter-onset interval.
Sematic and episodic memories are formed and retrieved when a special warning sound
is played. If receivers are familiar with the sound, rule-based decision-making is
processed. Otherwise, the sound will only gain attention. Developers should consistent
using the same sound for the same threat, so that it will not confuse people.
Flashing patterns have been used in warning contexts for years. Flashing lights
used as a signal of warnings, however, is not quite common in computer or mobile
devices. In recent years, researchers have started adding flashing light into warnings on
smart phones because the special effect could enhance the salience of a visual warning
[56]. Flashing rate is the main factor for a flashing warning component. Normally faster
flashing means the hazard requires more attention [83]. Rule-based decision-making is
used if receivers are familiar with these signals. Developers should carefully assign a
flashing rate. A suitable flashing rate varies by different warning components. For
example, researchers suggest that a 2Hz for large text blocks and 4Hz for a single key
word or icon [84]. The color of flashing light should also match color code for the levels
of danger.
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3.3

Discussion
Computer warnings are critical to prevent users from attacks. We propose the

analysis of computer warning designs using our LHBW model. The LHBW model
represents how humans process and interactions with computer warnings in five levels.
We provide classifications of warning designs in each level. We also analyze recent
warning designs and provide suggestions for these designs.
Many models have been developed to improve the effectiveness of warnings, but
even the best practices in existing warning design still facing some challenges. The most
critical challenges reduce the warning effectiveness are, habituation, balancing between
attention maintenance and the cost of compliance, identifying the correct time to display
a warning, and users’ intentional blindness.
Habituation to warnings is one of the most significant issues. Over-warning
makes using a program feel like a hazardous activity, and it distracts users from truly
significant or dangerous issues [35]. A problem could occur when an individual habituate
to a warning but has not yet acquired all the information from the warning. Another
potential problem is that if a person habituates to the general appearance of a warning, he
might not give attention to another similar-looking warning [14].
Another challenge is to balance between attention maintenance and the cost of
compliance. Active warnings require more attention and cost of compliance than passive
warnings [105] because users have to click buttons to proceed to the next step. It could
make users feel annoyed if there are too many active warnings and false warnings (i.e.,
the “cry-wolf” effect).
Identifying the correct time to display a warning is quite a challenge, too. A
warning will more likely attract and maintain attention when individuals are in an
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information-seeking mode than in other modes of thinking [21]. In other words, a person
who is actively looking for hazard-related information will be more likely to see and hear
a warning than a person occupied with other tasks. But warnings typically interrupt the
primary task of a user.
Researchers have also discovered that users have intentional blindness to some
warnings [14]. Intentional blindness is a failure to perceive a stimulus, even though it is
present within a receiver’s central vision [111]. One suggested reason for this is that
attention is selectively focused on another object or task and misses the seemingly
apparent stimulus. Other potential reasons are being in deep thought, day-dreaming, or
other inward focusing of attention.

43

CHAPTER 4

DYNAMIC WARNINGS – AN EYE GAZE - BASED APPROACH

Web applications and services are widely used. People may encounter many
cyberattacks in their daily lives. They may unnecessarily disclose identity information to
web service provider. Identity information may be collected and even maliciously used.
Computer warnings were designed to protect users from cyberattacks. However, people
ignore them in some cases [6]. On the other hand, people claimed that they concerned
about their private information, and they were careful about their identity information [7].
This contradiction may be explained by the ineffectiveness of warnings [8].
Researchers have been studying the effectiveness of warnings for decades. Often,
they used questionnaires and interviews to analyze the effectiveness of warnings.
Frameworks, such as the Communication–Human Information Processing (C-HIP) model
[32], the sequential model of human information processing [31], and the performance
model [21], may be also used to analyze the information processing of warnings [32]. In
recent years, warnings have been integrated into web or mobile applications to improve
users' attention to warnings [10][11][12][13]. However, there are limitations of previous
warning research. First, researchers do not usually provide quantitative information about
users’ attention during the experiments. Secondly, users' attention (eye gaze information)
has not been used as an input for warnings. Third, attention switch and the cost of
compliance are hard to evaluate. For example, a warning with a “close” button will force
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attention switch, but interrupt users’ current task. Users' attention is critical to warning
designs according to the C-HIP model [14].
The approach presented in this paper avoids these issues. We propose a dynamic
warning system using eye gaze information. The dynamic warnings show “at the right
time and at the right place." We assess and evaluate users’ attention to warning messages
by analyzing eye gaze data and recording user’s eye gaze movement into videos. The
output of a pilot study and an experiment is used as feedback to further improve the
design of our warnings. As suggested by Conzola and Wogalter [19], a way of reducing
the cost of compliance is to make the directed behavior easier to perform. Our dynamic
warnings fade out automatically and thus they reduce the cost of compliance. Users need
not take any action to close the warning. The warnings guide users’ attention by popping
up where the user looks.
In this research, eye gaze information is used not only in our evaluation but is also
integrated into warning design. Users’ eye gaze information is used to determine the
dynamic warning show-up time, fade-out time and location. We developed an Eye
Tracking Information Analysis (ETIA) tool to determine the warning’s show-up time and
fade-out time. The ETIA was also used to evaluate the effectiveness of the dynamic
warning and to record participants’ eye gaze movement in an experiment.
We conducted an experiment with 169 participants to evaluate the effectiveness
of dynamic warnings and compared the effectiveness of the dynamic warnings to typical
Windows warnings.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we present an eye gaze
based dynamic warning approach and its integration to a Windows 8 app. Section 4.2
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illustrates the ETIA tool. Section 4.3 discusses the experiment and our evaluation of the
dynamic warning approach. Finally, the last section concludes that the dynamic warning
could effectively protect identity information from exposure.
4.1

Eye Gaze Based Dynamic Warning System Design
In this section, we discuss the dynamic warning system. We focus on three areas,

warning message appearance, the warning display location, and the timing of the display.
We integrate these three parts into the C-HIP model as shown in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1 Eye gaze based dynamic warning design and evaluation.
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The design covers the delivery level to the behavior level. We deliver visual
warnings dynamically according to the coordinates of users' eye gaze. To attract users'
attention, the warning pops up when the eye gaze focuses on the identity input area (i.e.,
zip code area, in our study). To make sure users’ attention stays on the warning area to
verify they are reading and understanding the warning message, we force the warning to
display again if the user's eye gaze does not focus on warning area long enough (the
criteria in section 4.1.1). Researchers discovered that eye gaze fixation reflects where the
object interested [45]. The dynamic warning shows up where the user looks. If users’
behaviors show they are not interested in the warning (e.g., their eye gaze leaves the
warning message, they start to type something, or they click a textbox to input
something), the warning fades out. To trigger long-term memory related to theft, we
embedded a security metaphor to build the connection between the hazard and knowledge
or memories about theft.
Evaluation in Figure 4.1 refers to the evaluation of the quality of dynamic
warning display and effectiveness of the dynamic warning. We use the ETIA tool to
record the display of the dynamic warning to make sure the warning is delivered to users.
The ETIA tools collect the eye gaze information and a timestamp. Accordingly, we could
recognize if the user’s attention switched to the warning when it shows up. We could also
estimate the duration time a user spends to read the warning. We used post-experiment
questions like, "Please rate how much you understood the message in the warning” to
assess the effectiveness of warnings in comprehension level. Similarly, we asked
questions like “For the identity information you provided as truthful, please tell us why
you were willing to provide it” to get the motivation of users who providing truthful

47

identity information or falsified it. We applied statistical analysis to the post-experiment
questionnaire responses to evaluate the effectiveness of the dynamic warning designed to
protect people from exposing their private information.
4.1.1

Design of the Dynamic Warning System
Our dynamic warning system consists of three main parts, an eye tracker server, a

Window 8 app named ReservME, and a dynamic warning server. Figure 4.2 shows the
eye gaze based dynamic warning system architecture.

Figure 4.2 Eye gaze based dynamic warning system architecture.

The Eye Tracker Server collects eye gaze coordinates from an eye tracking device
attached to a Microsoft Surface Pro. We used an EyeTribe tracker in our experiment,
which allows head movements within a 40cm*30cm box at 65cm distance from the tablet.
The EyeTribe eye tracker has a sampling rate 30Hz [112]. The Eyetribe UI provided by
Eyetribe could help us make calibrations. The eye tracker provides a 0.5 to 1 degree
average accuracy of visual angle. The dynamic warning server communicates with the
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underlying Eye Tracker Server to obtain raw eye gaze data. We developed the dynamic
warning server by using NodeJS. We used a TCP socket to allow the system components
to communicate. The ReservME App communicated with the dynamic warning server to
collect smoothed eye gaze data and time stamps. We implemented the dynamic warnings
using eye control by applying the dynamic warning system with three components as
shown in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3 Dynamic warning system communications and controls.
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The dynamic warning server controls the whole system. It sets up a TCP socket
connection with the Eye Tracker Server and connects with ReservME. Steps 7 –14 in
Figure 4.3 illustrate the details of communications and controls of this system. The
dynamic warning server acquires eye information data from the Eye Tracker Server
asynchronously. Once the identity page in ReservME shows up, the socket between
ReservME and the dynamic warning server is created. ReservME acquires the smoothed
eye gaze coordinates data (App.X and App.Y) and timestamps from the dynamic warning
server asynchronously. (Smoothed eye-gaze coordinate calculation will be discussed in
section 4.1.5) The dynamic warning server checks the eye gaze coordinates and, if the
user’s eye gazes stays in the zip code area for more than 350ms, a warning pops up in the
ReservME app. The dynamic warning server then puts dynamic warning flag (DW flag)
to an ON state. If the dynamic warning server discovers that the user’s eye gaze leaves
the warning for more than 3500ms or a user uses a keyboard or touches the screen, the
dynamic warning in ReservME will fade out and the warning flag will switched to an
OFF state. If the dynamic warning is off, and users look at the warning less than 3000ms,
the warning will pop up again. Steps 7 to 14 loop when the socket between the dynamic
warning server and ReservME is on. The sockets disconnect when the identity page is not
used.
4.1.2

ReservME Software
ReservME (Figure 4.4) is a Window 8 app to integrate the dynamic warning

system. It is a restaurant table reservation app similar to OpenTable, which is a top ten
app on Windows phone, iOS, and Android. ReservME uses HTML5, CSS3, and
JavaScript. A personal information form appears after a restaurant is chosen. First name,
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last name, email, phone number, address, city, state, zip code, and credit card information
are requested in the app.
Considering the safety of participants’ privacy, we did not collect participants’
information. Rather, we captured whether any information was entered into the data
fields. Our previous research [113][67] found that users are sensitive to their email,
phone, and zip code being exposed. In our experiment, we selected zip code as the field
to prompt the warning. A dynamic warning appeared when a user's eye gaze focused on a
field into which they can input their personal information.

Figure 4.4 Reservme and Eyetribe eye tracker.
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4.1.3

Dynamic Warning Message Design
Figures 4.5 (a) and (b) show the screen shots of the replayed video for the

ReservME App before and after the dynamic warning popped up. Figure 4.5 (c) shows a
screen shot of the replayed video after the dynamic warning faded out. The red box is an
EyeGaze box, which is an approximate area at which participants are looking. (There is
more detail about the EyeGaze box explained in section 4.2) The dynamic warning
message includes three sentences as follows “DO NOT disclose this information!”
“Someone may steal your private information!” “TIPS: You can Falsify them.” We added
a theft metaphor image to the right of the warning message. The metaphor showed
alongside with the second sentence in warning message. This provided an emotional
influence on a user’s risk evaluation. According to the C-HIP model [32], an effective
warning should provide instructions to avoid consequences of a risk or indicate that
effective preventive behavior cannot be guaranteed. A recommended safe response in an
online table reservation context was thus provided by the third sentence to make this
warning message more effective.
According to the C-HIP model and Wogalters’ research [114][60], interactive
warnings should be noticed, recalled and comprehended better than static warnings (or
on-product warnings). Researchers also found that warnings can be dull in appearance
and become less noticeable if their exposure duration and frequency exceed an adequate
range [14]. We, therefore, decided to design a warning to “pop up just in time” and “fade
out just in time.” The “pop up” action of this warning enhanced the attention. And the
duration of the warning plays a role in attention maintenance. The “fade out” action could
reduce the habituation and “overwarning” issue by removing the warning when users do
not really need the warning.
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(a) Before a dynamic warning pops up

(b) After the dynamic warning pops up

(c) After the dynamic warning fades out

Figure 4.5 Screenshots of the identity page Reservme app.
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4.1.4

Dynamic Warnings Show Up Time and Fade Out Time
The key to effective warnings is to display them at the moment when users need

the warning and to remove them at the moment when users do not need the warning.
These moments could be identified by using eye tracking information. Research on the
human’s eye movement while reading a warning [81] suggested that the time people
interacted with a warning could be separated to a location time and a decision time. The
location time started from when a user’s eye gaze entered the target area to when the
participant’s eye gaze left the area. The decision time started from when a participant's
eye gaze left the target area to the time participants started to type on a keyboard or click
on the touch screen.
Our design goal is to pop up the warning between location time and decision time.
The location time and decision time varies in different contexts, so we conducted a pilot
study to identify the warning pop up time. This pilot study used an Eyetribe Tracker
device and the ETIA tool. Five students from the psychology and computer science
department were recruited as volunteers for the pilot test. In the pilot, we separated the
total time of eye gaze into searching time, location time, and decision time. The searching
time started from the time the identity page (Figure 4.5 (a)) loaded to the time a
participant’s eye gaze entered the target area (i.e., the zip code data entry field in this
pilot test). The location time started from when a user’s eye gaze entered the zip code
area to when the participant’s eye gaze left the area. The decision time started from when
a participant's eye gaze left the zip code area to the time participants started to type on a
keyboard or click on the touch screen. The mean searching time on our pilot testing was
1258ms. The mean location time was 311ms. The mean decision time was 485ms.
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Based on pilot testing, we decided that the warning should show up when
participant’s eye gaze was maintained in the zip code data entry field for 350ms. In this
way, we could make the dynamic warning pop up when a user focused on the target area
(i.e., zip code data entry field) before they decide to input this information.
To determine the time to fade-out of the dynamic warning, we conducted a second
pilot study with another 12 students. This time, we added the dynamic warning that
popped up on the top of the zip code data entry field. We changed the target area to the
warning area. By using the ETIA tool, we could ascertain searching time, location time,
and decision time on this area for each participant.
In the pilot testing, we found that, in the most cases, participants’ eye gaze
entered and left the target area many times. We redefined searching time to begin from
the warning pop up to the start time of the longest duration of the dynamic warning. The
location time is redefined as the longest duration of the eye gaze on dynamic warning. To
illustrate how we made decisions about pop up and fade out times, we show data from
one participant in Figure 4.6. Eye gaze durations on dynamic warnings are plotted in
Figure 4.6. The X- and Y-coordinates of the data points in Figure 4.6 illustrate the
timestamp when the participant’s eye gaze enter the dynamic warning area, and eye gaze
duration on dynamic warning area. The ten data points demonstrate that this participant’s
eye gaze fixed on the dynamic warning ten times. The location duration varies from
100ms to 5700ms. The longest fixation duration for this participant was 5700ms, which
happened 24700ms after the page loaded. The decision time began from the end
timestamp of the longest duration of gaze on the dynamic warning to the timestamp of
when a participant input something on the keyboard or clicked on the touch screen. The
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mean searching time on this pilot test is 652ms. The mean location time was 3285ms.
The mean decision time is 1874ms and the maximum decision time is 3144ms. From
these pilot testing results, we decided to design the warning message to fade out if any of
the following three conditions commit.

Figure 4.6 Participant’s eye gaze durations on dynamic warning.
The first condition was when a participant’s eye gaze left the warning area for
3500ms. The second condition was when the participant started to type. The third
condition was when the participant clicked the touch screen. The “fade out” action relies
on these three conditions because when the participants’ behavior fit these conditions,
they are not interested in the warning and had already made a decision about whether to
disclose. According to the the results, we decided to add a new feature to the “pop-up”
action. If the participant eye gaze duration on a warning message lasted less than 3000ms,
the dynamic warning popped up again.
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4.1.5

Dynamic Warning Location
The warning message is spatially optimized. Our strategy is to show the warning

right next to the eye gaze spot when a user’s eye gaze stays in the target area (e.g., zip
code area) for 350ms. In this way, the dynamic warning could improve the attention
switch indicated by the C-HIP model because the warning message shows up very close
to the exact spot on which the participants are focusing.
We use the dynamic warning location algorithm (Algorithm 1) to calculate the
coordinates (𝐴𝑝𝑝. 𝑋𝑖 , 𝐴𝑝𝑝. 𝑌𝑖 ) to show a dynamic warning. We identity if the current eye
gaze collect from the Eyetribe server is a fixation gaze or saccades gaze based on the
value of velocity of current eye gaze and previous eye gaze. As defined, fixation gazes
are pauses over informative regions of interest and saccades gazes are rapid movements
between fixations [115].
The Eyetribe server provides a timestamp, raw gaze coordinates in pixels, average
eye gaze coordinates in pixels, raw and smoothed gazed coordinates in pixels separated
by left eye and right eye, pupil size, and normalized pupil coordinates. We could
therefore obtain average eye gaze coordinates (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 ) and (𝑥𝑖−1 , 𝑦𝑖−1 ) of left and right
eyes on current timestamp i and previous timestamp i-1 from Eyetribe SDK. The
sampling rate of the Eyetribe eye tracker is 60Hz. The velocity of current gaze point and
previous gaze point could be calculated using the equation of velocity in Algorithm 4.1.
We set a threshold (threshold=20mm/ms) to separate the fixation gaze and
saccades gaze; if the velocity is below the threshold, the location to show a dynamic
warning corresponds to the coordinates of current eye gaze. If the velocity is greater than
the threshold, we display the dynamic warning at the middle point between current and
previous eye gaze point.
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Algorithm 4.1. Dynamic Warning Location Algorithm
Input: Average eye gaze coordinates (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 ) at current time i and average eye gaze
coordinates (𝑥𝑖−1 , 𝑦𝑖−1 ) at previous time i-1
Output: The coordinates (𝐴𝑝𝑝. 𝑋𝑖 , 𝐴𝑝𝑝. 𝑌𝑖 ) to show a dynamic warning.
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 20;
Calculate 𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 =

2
√(𝑥𝑖 −𝑥𝑖−1 )2 +(𝑦 −𝑦
𝑖
𝑖−1 )

1000/60

if velocity<threshold
The (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 ) is a fixation gaze;

(𝐴𝑝𝑝. 𝑋𝑖 , 𝐴𝑝𝑝. 𝑌𝑖 ) = (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 );
else
The (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 ) is a saccades gaze;

(𝐴𝑝𝑝. 𝑋𝑖 , 𝐴𝑝𝑝. 𝑌𝑖 ) = (

4.2

|𝑥𝑖 +𝑥𝑖−1 | |𝑦𝑖 +𝑦𝑖−1 |
2

,

2

);

Eye Tracking Information Analysis
For evaluation proposes, as shown in Figure 4.1, we developed ETIA, which

recorded user’s actions, dynamic warnings, and fade outs. The eye gaze locations and
durations on warning areas were also recorded. The user interface of ETIA shows in
Figure 4.7. It was created using C#, Aforge.NET framework [116], and AForge FFMPEG
libraries. Mouse movements and eye gaze box locations were also recorded. Frames per
Second (FPS) could be defined. Calibration was required before the software was
connected to the Eye Tribe. Connection states, pupil sizes and smoothed eye gaze
coordinates were captured and stored by ETIA. Figure 4.5 illustrates the frames captured
by the ETIA tool. Smoothed eye gaze coordinates, pupil size, and timestamp data are
saved in a txt file. The ETIA tool was used in pilot testing and the experiment to evaluate
the dynamic warning system.
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Another feature of the ETIA tool is EyeGaze Box. The EyeGaze box indicates the
eye focus area approximately. The size of EyeGaze Box is changed based on the pupil
size. We use Equation (4.1) to determine the smoothed pupil size for each frame. To
calculate the size of the EyeGaze Box, we use Equation (4.2) and (4.3). And we use
Equation (4.4) to determine the location of EyeGaze Box.

Figure 4.7 Eye tracking information analysis tool.

1 ∑𝑖𝑖−𝑛 𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑡. 𝑃𝑖 + ∑𝑖𝑖−𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡. 𝑃𝑖
𝑃𝑖 = [
]
2
𝑅/𝐹𝑃𝑆

(4.1)

We acquired smoothed pupil size 𝑃𝑖 on video frame 𝑖 by averaging the smoothed
left eye pupil size and right eye pupil size. Left eye and right eye pupil sizes could be
sampled at 60Hz or 30Hz by the Eyetribe. R in Equation. (4.1) indicates the sampling rate,
which was 60Hz in our experiment to ensure accuracy. To reduce noise, the target 𝑃𝑖 was
determined by an average of the previous n data points of the left eye and right eye pupil
sizes. These data points were collected starting from the end time of the previous video
frame to the start time of the current video frame. That is 𝑛 = 𝑅 ⁄𝐹𝑃𝑆.

59

𝑊𝑖 = (

𝐷𝑖 + (𝑐 − 𝑎)
) × 𝑃𝑖 + |𝑥𝑟 − 𝑥𝑙 |
𝑑−𝑟

(4.2)

Equation (4.2) is used to estimate the width of the EyeGaze Box (the red box in
Figure 4.5), which indicates the approximate width of the focus area, based on eye gaze
coordinates and pupil size. Equation (4.2) is based on Crane’s research on eye tracker
Purkinje Image [117]. 𝑊𝑖 is the width of EyeGaze Box in ETIA at time 𝑖. As shown in
Figure 4.8, 𝐷𝑖 is the distance between the eyetracker and a participant’s eyes at time 𝑖.
𝑐 ≈ 13.5𝑚𝑚, 𝑎 ≈ 6𝑚𝑚, 𝑟 ≈ 7.8𝑚𝑚, 𝑑 ≈ 24𝑚𝑚 come from Schematic diagram of
eyes [117]. 𝑃𝑖 is smoothed pupil size from Equation (4.1). 𝑥𝑟 and 𝑥𝑙 is right eye and left
eye coordinates on X axis.

Figure 4.8 Schematic diagram of eyes and screens.
Equation (4.3) is used to estimate the length of EyeGaze Box (the red box in
Figure 4.5) which indicates the approximate length of the focus area based eye gaze
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coordinates and pupil size. 𝐿𝑖 is the length of EyeGaze Box in ETIA at time 𝑖. 𝑦𝑟 and 𝑦𝑙
indicate the right eye and left eye coordinates on the Y axis. 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑐, 𝑎, 𝑟, and 𝑑 are the
same measurement as use in Equation (4.2). Once we calculate the size of the EyeGaze
Box we can determine the location of the EyeGaze Box (𝐵𝑜x. 𝑋𝑖 , 𝐵𝑜𝑥. 𝑌𝑖 ) on time 𝑖 by
Equation (4.4).

𝐿𝑖 = (

𝐷𝑖 + (𝑐 − 𝑎)
) × 𝑃𝑖 + |𝑦𝑟 − 𝑦𝑙 |
𝑑−𝑟

(𝐵𝑜𝑥. 𝑋𝑖 , 𝐵𝑜𝑥. 𝑌𝑖 ) = (𝑋𝑖 −

(4.3)

𝑊𝑖
𝐿𝑖
, 𝑌𝑖 − )
2
2

∑𝑖 𝑥𝑖 𝑊𝑖 ∑𝑖𝑖−𝑛 𝑦𝑖 𝐿𝑖
(𝐵𝑜𝑥. 𝑋𝑖 , 𝐵𝑜𝑥. 𝑌𝑖 ) = ( 𝑖−𝑛 −
,
− )
𝑅/𝐹𝑃𝑆
2 𝑅/𝐹𝑃𝑆 2

(4.4)

We obtain the smoothed x and y coordinates (𝑋𝑖 , 𝑌𝑖 ) by averaging the eye gaze
data points that were collected starting from the end time of the previous video frame to
the start time of the current video frame.
4.3
4.3.1

Experiment
Description and Hypotheses
We conducted an experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of dynamic warnings.

Based on the C-HIP model, we used both the ETIA tool and post-experiment
questionnaires for evaluation.
The design of this experiment has four conditions: (a) the control condition with
no mindlessness attack (described below) and no warning, (b) the mindlessness attack
condition with mindlessness attack messages but no warning, (c) the dynamic warning
condition with the dynamic warning message and the mindlessness attack, and (d) the
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typical Win8.1 warning condition with the typical Win8.1 warning showing up under the
mindlessness attack.
Mindlessness attacks are psychological cyber identity attacks that attempt to
access more information from users [118]. Our previous research [67][118] instituted
mindlessness attacks within a web-based online shopping context and an automobile
insurance quote. Under mindlessness attack conditions, participants disclosed more
personal identity information. In our current experiment, some participants were under
mindlessness attack and we introduced dynamic warnings to protect participants from
exposing their identity information.
The conditions with mindlessness attacks consist of a mindlessness attack in the
rectangular text box as showed in Figure 4.5 (a). The mindlessness attack message
explains the reason for requiring the identity information. For example, the reason that
email was requested was “You will receive electronic coupons for the restaurant you
reserved.” The condition with the dynamic warning consisted of a dynamic warning
presented in the form of warning text and a theft metaphor image background by a yellow
rectangle (Figure 4.5(b)), and showed up when participants focused on the zip code area.
Figure 4.9 represents a screenshot of the ReservME App with a mindlessness attack in
the rectangular text box and a typical Windows 8.1 warning. When participants move the
cursor to zip code textbox, a typical Win8.1 warning (the standard windows 8.1 warning)
was shown.
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Figure 4.9 Screenshot of the Reservme app using a typical Windows 8.1 warning.
First, we hypothesized that participants under mindlessness attack with no
warning would be more likely to disclose information than in the control condition
(comparing conditions (a) and (b); Hypothesis 4.1). This is a replication of previous
research and serves as a manipulation check. We also hypothesized that participants in
the dynamic warning condition would be less likely to disclose information than in the
mindlessness attack condition (comparing conditions (b) and (c); Hypothesis 4.2),
showing the effectiveness of the dynamic warning. Third, we predicted that participants
in dynamic warning condition would be less likely to disclose information than in the
typical Win8.1 warning condition (comparing conditions (c) to and (d); Hypothesis 4.3).
We also explored whether participants did read the warning message carefully in
dynamic warning condition. Finally, we were also interested in whether participants read
the dynamic warning more carefully than the typical Win8.1 Warning.
4.3.2

Participants
We recruited undergraduate students to attend the experiment. These students

received partial course credit for their participation. During the experiment, we lost three
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participants’ eye gaze information because they moved their head out of eye tracker’s
recognition area. We eliminated these three participants from the data on which we ran
analysis. Of the 169 validated participants, 96 were women, with ages ranging from 17
to 48 with a median 20 years. With respect to ethnicity, 91 participants were Caucasian,
33 had African heritage, 17 were Asian, 9 had Hispanic heritage, 3 reported Pacific
Island heritage, and 16 reported other ethnicities. The procedures of the experiment were
approved by our university’s IRB.
4.3.3

Procedures
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four ReservME app conditions.

There were 41 participants in the control condition, 46 participants in mindlessness
condition without a warning, 41 participants in a dynamic warning condition under attack
conditions and 41 participants in a typical Win8.1 warning condition under attack
conditions. They provided informed consent prior to the experiment. Participants were
given the cover story that the app was developed by a third-party software design
company, and the company was interested in feedback on its app design.
For each participant, at the beginning of the experiment, the eye tracker was
calibrated. Participants were asked a to disclose a variety of identity information
(including first name, last name, email address, home address, phone number, credit card
information) in the context of restaurant reservation. For each piece of identity
information, participants could choose whether or not to provide it. Participants did not
know that we were not storing any of the identity information they input before they
completed the post-experimental survey. At that point, they were debriefed that their
identity information was not stored or provided to a third party.
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After participants completed their reservation on ReservME, they were asked
follow-up questions about their opinion on the design of ReservME. Participants were
also asked whether they had provided truthful information when asked for their identity
information. We considered falsified information provided to be the same as no
information provided in our hypothesis tests. The effectiveness of the dynamic warning
system was evaluated by whether or not participants accurately disclosed their identity
information. Our primary dependent variable was the percent of participants who
disclosed truthful identity information. We also used our ETIA tool to analyze the
duration of time spent reading the dynamic warning.
4.3.4

Results
We replayed the videos recorded by ETIA for dynamic warning conditions and

found that 65.8% of participants’ eye gaze moved to dynamic warnings and stayed on
dynamic warnings, whereas 26.9% of participants directly clicked the “next” button
without input any information in identity page.
Figure 4.10 shows the percent of participants who provided truthful identity
information under conditions (a), (b), (c) and (d). The percentage of disclosure increased
under the mindlessness condition compared to the control condition. The percent of
participants who provided truthful identity information in the dynamic warning condition
decreased dramatically compared with the mindlessness and control conditions. The zip
code was the identity element for which the dynamic warning popped up. The dynamic
warning successfully decreased disclosure from 89.1% to 26.8%. However, zip code is
not the only element influenced by the dynamic warning. Email and phone number that
were requested after the warning not to disclose their zip code were also impacted. For
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email, the dynamic warning reduced disclosure under mindlessness attack from 93.5% to
31.7%. Similar reductions occurred for phone numbers.
Zip code is the identity element for which disclosure increased the most in the
mindlessness condition compared to the control condition. The percentage increased from
68.3% to 89.1%. Zip code is also the element for which disclosure decreased the most in
the dynamic warning condition compared with the mindlessness condition.
We used one-tailed Z-tests to compare the percentage of participants disclosing
their identity information across the conditions. The analysis showed significant
differences between the control condition and the mindlessness condition for zip code (p
= 0.008) and for credit card information (p = 0.027), as shown in Table 4-1. As predicted
in Hypothesis 4.1, the mindlessness attack increased identity disclosure. The Z-tests
between the mindlessness condition and the dynamic warning condition showed
significant differences for all identity information (p < 0.05), as shown in Table 4-2. Thus,
as predicted in Hypothesis 4.2, the dynamic warning reduced disclosure even under
mindlessness attack conditions.
Table 4-1 Z-tests for proportion of disclosure in control condition and
mindlessness conditions.
Identity information

Z-score

p- value

Odds ratio

Email

-1.540

0.062

3.48

Phone

-1.558

0.060

2.21

Address

-0.820

0.206

1.47

Zip Code

-2.395

0.008

3.81

Credit Card
information

-1.934

0.027

8.79
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89.10%
68.30%

73.90%
65.80%

60.00%

26.80%

30.00%

21.90%

26.80%

40.00%

31.70%

50.00%

43.90%

48.78%

70.00%

60.98%

80.00%

82.60%
68.30%

70.73%

90.00%

93.50%
82.90%

100.00%

0.00%
0.00%
8.70%
0.00%

20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
Email

Phone

Address

Zip code

Credit Card
information

Control condition

Mindlessness condition

Dynamic Warning condition

Traditional warning condition

Figure 4.10 Percent of participants disclosing identity information under the four
conditions.

Table 4-2 Z-tests for proportion of disclosure in mindlessness conditions and dynamic
warning conditions.
Identity information

Z-score

p-value

Odds ratio

Email

5.783

<0.001

30.87

Phone

5.075

<0.001

15.11

Address

4.713

<0.001

10.07

Zip Code

5.714

<0.001

22.36

Credit Card

1.934

0.027

8.79

Odds ratios shown in Table 4-1 measure the influence of warnings in the
mindlessness attack. For example, the odds ratio of zip code equaling 3.81 means that the
odds of exposing zip code were almost four times greater for participants who were under
the mindlessness attack than those who in the control. The hypothesis that the
participants under mindlessness attack would be more likely to disclose information than
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in control condition is supported. This replicates previous research and serves as a
manipulation check.
The odds ratios in Table 4-2. refer to the influence of dynamic warnings under
mindlessness attack. The odds ratio of the zip code is 22.36, which means the odds of not
exposing zip code in the dynamic warning condition were around 22 times greater than in
the mindlessness attack condition with no warning.
Figure 4.10 also shows the percent of participants who provided truthful identity
information under the attack condition in the typical Win8.1 warning condition and
dynamic warning condition. Zip code was the identity element for which disclosure
decreased the most in the typical Win8.1 warning condition compared to the attack
condition. The percentage decreased from 89.1% to 43.9%. Zip code was also the
element for which disclosure decreased the most in the dynamic warning condition
compared with the attack condition.
The percent of disclosure decreased under typical Win8.1 warning condition (Ztest shows in Table 4-2), and dynamic warning condition (Z-test shows in Table 4-3)
compared with the attack condition. The percent of participants who provided truthful
identity information in dynamic warning condition decreased more dramatically
compared to the typical Win8.1 warning condition (Z-test shows in Table 4-4).
We used one-tailed Z-tests to compare the percentage of participants disclosing
their identity information in conditions (c) and (d). The analysis shows significant
differences between the dynamic warning condition and the typical Win8.1 condition for
email (p < 0.001), phone number (p < 0.001), and for address (p = 0.005) and zip code (p
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= 0.053) as shown in Table 4-4. Thus Hypothesis 4.3, that the dynamic warning would be
more effective in reducing disclosure than the typical Win8.1 warning, was supported.
Odds ratios were also calculated to compare dynamic warnings and typical
Win8.1 warnings showed in Table 4-4. Fewer participants provided their information in
the dynamic warning condition. The odds ratio is 5.21, which means the odds of exposing
email in the dynamic warning condition were around 5 times less than in the typical
Win8.1 warning. And the odds of exposing zip code in the dynamic warning condition
were around 2 times less than in the typical Win8.1 warning condition. Thus, the first
hypothesis that the dynamic warning and typical Win8.1 warning reduce the disclosure is
supported. The second hypothesis that the dynamic warning is more effective than the
typical Win8.1 warning on protecting identity disclosure is also supported.
Table 4-3 Z-test for proportion of disclosure in traditional warning and
dynamic warning conditions.
Identity information

Z-score

p- value

Odd ratios

Email

3.534

<0.001

5.205

Phone

3.115

<0.001

4.261

Address

2.541

0.006

3.386

Zip

1.617

0.053

2.134

Table 4-4 Z-test for proportion of disclosure in traditional warning and mindlessness
attack conditions.
Identity information

Z-score

p- value

Odd ratios

Email

-2.822

0.002

5.931

Phone

-2.252

0.012

3.040

Address

-2.410

0.007

2.975

Zip

-4.504

<0.001

10.478
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In the post-experimental survey, we asked participants to rate whether they agreed
to the following statements (1 for Strongly disagree to 5 for Strongly agree).
“I read the warning message carefully.” (Q1)
“I understood the warning message.” (Q2)
Figure 4.11 shows that the percentage of participants in the dynamic warning
condition who thought they carefully read the warning message (ratings >= 3) nonsignificantly increased from 75.61% to 85.37% compared with typical Win8.1 warning
condition (p = 0.131). In terms of understanding the warning message, the percentage of
participants who rated “Neutral” to “Strongly agree” for understanding the warning
significantly increased from 87.8% to 97.56% for dynamic warning compared with
typical Win8.1 warning (p < 0.1). We also asked participants if they thought the warning
message was useful (Q3). Fewer participants reported “Yes” for typical Win8.1 warnings
(75.61%) than dynamic warnings (87.8%, p < 0.1). Z-tests of these results appear in
Table 4-5.
Table 4-5 Z-test for results of questions Q1-Q3 in traditional warning and
dynamic warning conditions.
Questions

Z-score

p- value

Q1

-1.115

0.131

Q2

-1.697

0.044

Q3

-1.428

0.076
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1

2

3

4

34.15%
41.46%
53.66%
58.54%

24.39%
29.27%
21.95%
14.63%

Understading dynamic warning

17.07%
14.63%
12.20%
24.39%

Understanding traditional warning

7.32%
9.76%
2.44%
0.00%

Carefully read dynamic warning

17.07%
4.88%
9.76%
2.44%

Carefully read traditional warning

5

RATING

Figure 4.11 Participants’ ratings of how much they carefully read and
understood the warning message.

4.3.5

Summary of Results
The results of the experiment show that a dynamic warning could prevent users

from disclosing identity information that they are asked to provide. The results also show
that dynamic warnings can be an effective countermeasure for a mindlessness identity
attack. Dynamic warnings not only impacted disclosure of the targeted identity element,
but also impacted disclosure of other identity elements in the same page. The comparison
of dynamic warnings and typical Win8.1 warning show that both dynamic warnings and
typical Win8.1 warnings deter users from disclosing identity information under
mindlessness attack. The results also show that dynamic warnings are more effective than
typical Win8.1 warnings in this context. In addition, users believed dynamic warnings
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were easier to understand than typical Win8.1 warnings. The ETIA video and data
indicate that dynamic warnings did attract and maintain users’ attention.
4.4

Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose an eye gaze-based dynamic warning solution. The

dynamic warning message integrated a security metaphor, a vivid consequence message,
and a recommended safe response message. Eye gaze information was used to control the
dynamic warning’s pop up time, fade out time, and location. We also developed an ETIA
tool to analyze participants’ eye gazes. ETIA was applied in pilot tests and the main
experiment. Our experimental results show promising impacts of the warning
countermeasure to protect identity information. The design of dynamic warnings reduced
disclosure, and the eye gaze-based warnings are an effective way to switch and hold a
user’s attention at the right time in the right place. ETIA provides a virtualization and
replay tool to analyze the interaction of users’ eyes gaze and pupil characteristics on
specific apps and warnings.
Our study has a few limitations. First, the participants in our experiment were
students. Thus, the data may be biased by an age factor. Second, our experiment focused
on whether dynamic warnings changed users' behavior on identity disclosure under
mindlessness attacks. The results might not be applied to other types of attacks that are
launched to elicit private information from users.
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CHAPTER 5

SUBLIMINAL WARNINGS – A NEW APPROACH TO CALL
ATTENTION TO SECURITY HAZARDS

In this chapter, we discuss a new approach that uses a subliminal message to call
users’ attention to security hazards. Contemporary research in cognitive psychology
reveals that part of our information processing is at the conscious level, whereas other
perception efforts may take place beneath a threshold and thus we are not consciously
aware (known as subliminal). Subliminal messages, icons or images have been used for
decades to influence purchase behavior, to increase self-esteem, to improve memory, or
even to stop people from smoking [119]–[122].
Our research goals are (1) to design effective subliminal warning messages via
experiments and (2) to evaluate the design of subliminal warning messages.
First, we describe a pilot study on three types of subliminal stimuli - text
messages, images, and icons. We designed a subliminal warning message based on the
results of the pilot study. Second, we present an advanced version of Eye Tracking
Information Analysis - ETIA tool. The tool verifies if users’ attention focuses on the area
of subliminal primes when they show up. Third, we conducted an experiment to evaluate
the effectiveness of a warning using subliminal messages.
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5.1

Subliminal Warning Design

5.1.1

Pilot User Study
Based on the subliminal primes which we discovered on websites, we conducted a

set of pilot studies to test the effectiveness of subliminal stimuli. We tested two types of
subliminal stimuli (i.e., text messages, and icons). In Table 5-1, we represent the
conditions tested in the pilot studies.
Table 5-1 Pilot study conditions.
Condition
Code

PSWM1
PSAM

PSWM2
PSWI

PSAI

•

Subliminal
Prime

Message:
“Fake it”
Message:
“Give
Address”
Message:
“Fake it”
Icon:
Yellow
Triangle
Icon:
Yellow
Triangle

Warning or
Attack

Duration

Display
Frequency

Display

Warning

50ms

Five Times

At the top of Address textbox

Attack

50ms

Five Times

At the top of Address textbox

Warning

50ms

Once

At the top of Address textbox

Warning

50ms

Five Times

At the right of “Next” button

Attack

50ms

Five Times

At the right of Address textbox

Pilot study on warning message condition 1 (PSWM1): A study tested a
subliminal mitigation – a message “Fake it” was used as a subliminal warning
message. The message displayed between a pre-mask image and a post-mask
image. The pre-mask was a food image displayed 2000ms before the subliminal
prime. The post-mask was a food image displayed 2000ms after the subliminal
prime. The subliminal message displayed 5 times before the identity input page.
On the identity input page, the message was shown again when a user clicked the
address input box. Subliminal messages were shown for 50ms.
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•

Pilot study on attack message condition (PSAM): A pilot study tested a subliminal
attack - a message “Give address” was used as a subliminal attack. The message
showed as described in PSWM1.

•

Pilot study on warning message condition 2 (PSWM2): A pilot study tested the
message, “Fake it”, and it showed only once for 50ms.

•

Pilot study on warning icon condition (PSWI): A pilot study tested a symbol - a
yellow triangle (pointed to left). We used a pre-mask image and a post-mask
image. It displayed 5 times before an identity input page. The duration was set to
50ms. In the identity input page, the icon shows up at the right side of “Next”
button.

•

Pilot study on attack icon condition (PSAI): A pilot study tested the same icon as
PSWI but the icon popped up at the right side of address input textbox.
We recruited 22 participants for our pilot study. Participants were randomly

assigned to one of the eight conditions. We tested 7 participants in PSWM1, and 5
participants for each other conditions (PSAM, PSWM2, PSWI, and PSAI). The pilot
study was approved by IRB (See Appendix II).
Before the pilot study experiment, participants needed to fill out the consent form.
The form, however, did not fully inform subjects of the nature of their experiment. The
pilot study followed conditions in Table 5-1. We conducted the pilot study on lab
computers equipped with eye tracking devices to measure eye movements.
Participants navigated through a restaurant reservation application that requests
identity information. The subliminal stimuli automatically appeared in pages or when
identity elements were requested. After completing the table reservation app, participants
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completed a post-experiment questionnaire including questions about the quality of the
application, subliminal stimuli discovery and comprehension, feedback on data provided,
and demographic information (see Appendix III). We did not store participants’ identity
information. In the database, we used “1” to represent that participants input information
and “0” to represent no input.
At the end of a pilot study, all participants received a debriefing which clearly
indicated that their personal information was not captured (except in the demographic
questionnaire data survey) and that their personal information would not be sent to a third
party. The percentage of participants who disclosed their identity information is shown in
Table 5-2.
Table 5-2 Pilot study result.
subliminal Condition
prime
Code
Fname

message
icon

5.1.2

Lname Email

Phone
Number

Address

Zip code

PSWM1

71%

57%

43%

29%

43%

57%

PSAM

100%

100%

60%

80%

80%

80%

PSWM2

80%

80%

20%

20%

25%

20%

PSWI

100%

100%

80%

80%

80%

80%

PSAI

100%

100%

100%

80%

100%

100%

Subliminal Warning Message Design
From the results of the pilot studies, we could see that a warning design with

subliminal message shows up once are more effective than other subliminal warning
designs. We select of the subliminal message, “Fake it,” for our experiments. The “Fake
it” message is framed in a red border with white background. Figure 5.6 shows the
screenshots of the subliminal message. We used the white background for the message
because the ReservME app is in the black background. The goal is to use color-contrast
to gain users’ attention on the warning message area. We used the a thick red border
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because according to Wogalter’s research [79], a warning with thick border is more
salient than no border. The subliminal message shows when a user clicks the address text
box. The duration of the subliminal message was 50ms. Figure 5.5 shows the process of
the subliminal warning message.

Figure 5.1 The process of a subliminal warning message.

Figure 5.2 The screenshot of the subliminal message.
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5.2

Eye-Gaze Based Verification System
We designed an eye-gaze based verification system (ETIA 2.0) to verify whether

users’ eyes look at the area of subliminal primes. The eye-gaze based verification system
consists of four components: the ETIA software, SMI eye tracker server, scene camera,
and the ReservME application (as shown in Figure 5.7). The eye tracker server collects
raw eye gaze information (left and right eye gaze coordinates, timestamps) by sampling
at 250Hz. The scene camera captures the screen display at 125Hz. We use the scene
camera to verify the duration of the subliminal primes. Our ReservME app is a Windows
8 application which we integrated subliminal warnings or attacks. The ReservME app
collects events and event timestamps. ETIA collects corresponding information from the
other 3 components and integrates them for visualization. Figure 5.8 shows the devices
for the eye-gaze based verification system.

Figure 5.3 Architecture of eye-gaze based verification system.
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Figure 5.4 The devices for the eye-gaze based verification system.
Figure 5.9 shows the screenshot of the ETIA 2.0. Figure 5.9 (a) is the data collection tab
of ETIA 2.0. We use TCP/IP for the communication between ETIA components. During
the experiment, researchers start the eye tracking server first, then connect the eye
tracking server, the ReservME app and the scene camera. The eye positions are shown in
the observer’s panel. The images captured by the scene camera are shown in the scene
camera panel. The observer’s panel is used for validation (users’ head and eye positions
and the lighting condition of the lab). Researchers may adjust a participant's position
based on the eye image monitor. For example, a down arrow indicates that the participant’
head needs to move backward. A white cross indicates the center of participant’s pupil.
The black cross indicates the center of first Purkinje image. Purkinje images are
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reflections of objects from the structure of the eye. Eye trackers use first Purkinje image
to measure the position of an eye. [117]. Light reflection may influence the quality of eye
images. If light reflection spots covered the pupil image or the Purkinje image, the
lighting condition in the lab needed to be changed (close the blinds or turn off the ceiling
lights). Researchers validated the quality of eye images before recording eye gaze data.

(a) A screenshot of data collection tab of the ETIA.

(b) A screenshot of data visualization tab of the ETIA.
Figure 5.5 Screenshots of ETIA.
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Equations (5.1), (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4) show the data collected by ETIA. 𝐸𝑇𝑖 is a record
collected from the eye tracker server at time i. It consists of three parts, the local
timestamp 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑖 , X coordinate 𝑋𝑖 and Y coordinate 𝑌𝑖 . 𝑆𝐶𝑗 is a record we collected
from the scene camera at time j. The 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑗 is the local timestamp, the 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑗 is a
video frame captured by scene camera. 𝑅𝑀𝑘 represents a record collected by ReservME
application. 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑘 is a record of an event, such as “subliminal prime message shows up”
or “subliminal prime message fades out”. 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑘 is the local timestamp of the
event. 𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑚 is a record of a screenshot. 𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑚 is the name of a screenshot (Such as
“subliminal prime shows up”) when an event happens, 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑚 is the path of a screenshot
file.
𝐸𝑇𝑖 = (𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖 , 𝑌𝑖 )

(5.1)

𝑆𝐶𝑗 = (𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑗 , 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑗 )

(5.2)

𝑅𝑀𝑘 = (𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑘 , 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑘 )

(5.3)

𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑚 = (𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑚 , 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑚 )

(5.4)

The data recorded by ETIA is stored locally. When we visualize the eye gaze
movements, we use Algorithm 5.1 to generate a video with eye gaze dots. (A detailed
verion of the Algorithm 5.1 is shown in Appendix I.) Figure 5.9 (b) shows the screenshot
of visualization tab ETIA 2.0. We generate eye gaze video by importing eye gaze data
file, event data file and screenshots. The scene camera video displays on the left scene
camera panel. The eye gaze visualization video for the same participant displays on the
right eyetracking panel. The yellow dots in the eye gaze visualization video indicate the
participant’s eye gaze fixation spots.
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Algorithm 5.1.

ETIA VISUALIZATION ALGORITHM

Input: Data table with eye gaze coordinates and a local timestamp for each record: 𝐸𝑇𝑖 =
(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖 , 𝑌𝑖 );
Data table with an event and a local timestamp, for each record 𝑅𝑀𝑘 = (𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑘 , 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑘 );
Data table with screenshot names and addresses, for each record 𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑚 = (𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑚 , 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑚 );
Output: The video visualizes the eye gaze movements.

Create a VT table with 𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =

(𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 , 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 , 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 , 𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 , 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 )
𝑖 = 0; 𝑘 = 0; 𝑚 = 0; 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 0; 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 0;
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑅𝑀𝑘 . 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡; 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 𝑅𝑀𝑘 . 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝;
𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑅𝑀𝑘+1 . 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡; 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 𝑅𝑀𝑘+1 . 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝;

for each record 𝐸𝑇𝑖 in Eye Gaze Information Table do
if the 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑖 in 𝐸𝑇𝑖 in the duration of 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑘
create a record in VT table
For each record in VT table.
For each record in SCS table
If 𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑚 . 𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒
Draw an eye gaze dot at coordinate (X, Y) = (𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝑋, 𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝑌) in a
screenshot graph stored in 𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑚 . 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ.

5.3
5.3.1

Experiment
Description and Hypothesis
We conducted an experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of the subliminal

warnings. We use the eye-gaze based verification system and the post-experiment
questionnaires for evaluation.
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The design of this experiment has two conditions, the control condition with no
warning and the subliminal warning condition with subliminal warning messages. We
hypothesized that participants under the subliminal warning condition would be less
likely to disclose information than those in the control condition.
5.3.2

Participants
We recruited 61 undergraduate students to attend the experiment. These students

received partial course credit for their participation. Our eye-gaze verification system lost
two participants’ eye gaze information. One with high myopia. Another one who wore
mascara. We did not include these two participants’ data. For the remaining 59
participants, 30 were randomly assigned to the control condition, 29 were assigned to the
subliminal warning condition. Thirty-seven were women, and twenty-one were men. One
participant did not report gender. Participants’ age ranges from 17 to 39 with a median 20
years. For the ethnicity, 45 participants were Caucasian, 4 had African heritage, 4 were
Asian, 3 had Hispanic heritage, 2 reported other ethnicities, and 1 did not report ethnicity.
The procedures of the experiment were approved by our university’s IRB (see Appendix
II).
5.3.3

Procedures
During the experiment, participants were provided informed consent prior to the

experiment. They were given the cover story by a disclaimer form that the app was
developed by a third-party software design company, and the experiment was a user
study for app design. The researcher explained the procedures of the experiment, after
participants signed the consent form and disclaimer form. Researcher explained the
devices (eye tracker, scene camera, keyboard and mouse) to the participants.
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Participants were notified that 1) their eye gaze information would be stored and
analyzed, 2) they would go through a table reservation application, and 3) the researcher
would not talk to them after they logged into the table reservation application, until they
reached the “Thanks for your participation” page. All the decisions would be made by the
participants.
Figure 5.8 shows the devices for the experiment. For each participant, the eye
tracker was calibrated at the beginning of the experiment. Researchers adjusted the
participant’s position and lab lighting conditions based on the eyes’ images showed in the
observation panel in ETIA. The researcher started the system for participants.
Participants were asked to disclose their identity information in the ReservME app. The
sequence of requested identity information was 1) first name and last name, 2) home
address (including street address, city, state and zip code), 3) email and phone number.
For all the identity information, participants could choose to provide it or not. They did
not know that none of their identity information was stored before they completed the
post-experimental survey. They were debriefed about the “real” goal for the experiment
and that their identity information was not stored or provided to a third party.
Participants were asked to fill a post-experiment survey. The survey included
questions about their opinions on the design of ReservME, whether they had provided
with truthful information when asked for their identity information, and whether they
observed the subliminal message. In our hypothesis tests, we considered falsified
information provided to be the same as no information was provided. The effectiveness
of the subliminal warning was evaluated by whether or not participants accurately
disclosed their identity information. We used the percentage of participants who

84

disclosed truthful identity information as the primary dependent variable. We used our
ETIA 2.0 to analyze the time spent on the subliminal warning messages and to verify the
display duration of the subliminal warning messages.
5.3.4

Results
We used the scene camera to verify the display duration for the subliminal

messages. The performance data (the duration between each frame) of the videos
captured by the scene camera are shown in Figure 5.10. We randomly chose three videos
captured by the scene camera from the control condition (case 1 to 3) and three from
subliminal message condition (case 4 to 6). We randomly choose 1000 frames in each
case. The duration between frames is a normal distribution with mean equals 11.24ms
and standard derivation equals 1.54. Figure 5.11 illustrates the number of frames the
subliminal message that shows up in the video captured. We captured 29 videos for
participants in the subliminal condition. Three videos showed that the subliminal message
did not display because participants did not click the address textbox but went directly to
the next page. The subliminal message showed up in 26 videos. About 80% of the videos
displayed the subliminal message in 6 or 7 frames. Based on the result of scene camera’s
performance data, we verified that the display durations of the subliminal message for
more than 80% of the experiments were in the range of 58.2ms and 89.46ms.
We stored the eye-gaze data and analyzed the eye-gaze data using ETIA. We
found that for 44.8% of the participants, their eye gazes moved to the subliminal message,
whereas for 44.8% of them, their eye gazes were just fixed on the textbox. For 10.3% of
participants, they clicked the “next” button without inputting any information in the
identity page. Even though eye-gaze information indicated that 44.8% participants did
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see the subliminal message, only 5 of participants reported that they realized there was a
“Fake it” message.
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Figure 5.6 The performance of the videos captured by the scene camera.
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Figure 5.7 Number of frames the subliminal message shows up in the video.
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Figure 5.12 shows the percent of participants who provided truthful identity
information under the control condition and the subliminal warning message condition.
The percentage of disclosure decreased under the subliminal warning message condition.
The address was the identity element for which the subliminal warning message popped
up. The subliminal warning message successfully decreased disclosure from 80% to
37.93%. However, the address field was not the only element influenced by the
subliminal warning. Email and phone number, that were requested after the warning,
were also impacted. For email, the subliminal warning reduced disclosure from 93.33%
to 48.27%. For phone number, the subliminal warning reduced disclosure from 86.66% to
41.37%.
100.00%

93.33%
86.66%

90.00%

80.00%

Percentage of disclosure

80.00%

76.66%

70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
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41.37%

40.00%

37.93%

30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
Email

Phone
Contro condition

Address

Zip

Subliminal message condition

Figure 5.8 Percent of participants disclosing identity information under the control
condition and subliminal warning condition.
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We used one-tailed z-tests for two population proportions to compare the
percentage of participants disclosing their identity information across the conditions. The
analysis showed significant differences between the control condition and the subliminal
warning condition for address (p = 0.0005), email (p = 0.0001) and phone number (p =
0.0001), as shown in Table 5-3. As predicted, the subliminal warning messages decreased
identity disclosure.
Table 5-3 Z-tests for proportion of disclosure comparing the control condition to the
subliminal warning condition.
Identity
Z score
P-value
Significance Odds
Information

value

ratio

Email

3.82

0.0001

<0.05

15

Phone

3.63

0.0001

<0.05

9.21

Address

3.29

0.0005

<0.05

6.55

Zip

2.00

0.0228

<0.05

3.07

Odds ratios shown in Table 5-3 measure the influence of the subliminal warning.
The odds ratio for the address field is 6.55. That indicates the odds of exposing an
address were almost seven times greater for participants who is under the control
condition than the subliminal warning condition.
During the experiment, we recorded participants’ response time on the disclosure
of address. If a participant input some information in address textbox, the response time
started as soon as he loaded the address page, end until he started to type in the address
textbox. If a participant did not input any information in address textbox, the response
time was the duration when he loaded the address page, until he clicked the next button,
or he typed in some information in other textboxes. Figure 5.13 shows the response time
for participants who did not disclose address information in the two conditions. The
88

response time of 72% participants in the subliminal condition was lower than 7s. The
response time of 100% participants in control condition was higher than 7s. Figure 5.14
shows the response time for participants who provided their address. The response time
of 83.3% participants in control condition was lower than 10s. The response time of 81.8%
participants in the subliminal condition was lower than 10s. The result of response time
indicates that the subliminal message may reduce the response time when users decide
not to expose their address information. We did not find a difference of response time
between the subliminal warning condition and the control condition when users exposed
their address.
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Figure 5.9 Response time of participants who did not expose address information.
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Figure 5.10 Response time of participants who exposed address information.

5.3.5

Summary of Results
The experimental results indicate that the subliminal warning could help users to

reduce the exposure of identity information that they were asked to provide it. The
subliminal warnings were not only effective on the targeted identity element, but also
impacted the disclosure of other identity elements requested afterwards. The display of
subliminal warnings was highly dependent on the system performance. For the system
that we are using (Intel Core i7-4610M CPU 3.00GHz 8.00GB RAM), the real display
duration of subliminal warning is during 58.2ms to 89.5ms, when we set the subliminal
duration 50ms in ReservME. The ETIA video and data indicate that the subliminal
warning did attract the attention of almost half of participants even though most of the
users did not report they noticed the subliminal warning. We found that the subliminal
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warning may reduce the response time when users decide not to disclose their identity
information.
5.4

Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a warning to reduce the disclosure of identity

information below the conscious level. The subliminal warning is a warning with a
recommended safe response message – "Fake it." We conducted a pilot study and test
three categories of warnings (message, image, and icon) to guide the design of the
subliminal warning. We developed an advance version of the ETIA tool which integrated
scene camera and an eye tracking device. We verified the display duration of the
subliminal warning and users' attention during the experiment. The result of the
experiment shows that the subliminal warning effectively reduced disclosure of identity
information. The subliminal warning may reduce the response time when users did not to
want to expose their identity information.
Our study has a few limitations. First, the participants in our experiment were
students. Thus, the data may be biased by an age factor. Second, the location of the
subliminal message is close to the target identity element. Analysis of eye gaze
information may be biased if the capture of eye gaze is not accurate. Third, the number of
participants is not big enough to test a hypothesis that the subliminal warning could
reduce the response time when the users decided not to disclose identity information.
This hypothesis will be tested in my future research.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

People encounter many security and privacy attacks. Software designers need to
know how to design effective warnings, which could protect users from the security and
privacy attacks. They want to design warnings be able to gain users’ attention but not
interrupt their main tasks.
In this dissertation, we have presented the Leveled Human Behavior Warning
Model to help designers improve their warning designs. The model classifies existing
warning design approaches into five levels: warning stimuli, warning perception, warning
storage and memory retrieval, decision-making, and behaviors. We have presented
different human processing paths for different warning components (symbols, signals,
messages).
Based on the Leveled Human Behavior Warning Model, we designed two kinds
of warnings – dynamic supraliminal warnings and subliminal warnings. The dynamic
supraliminal warning system used eye gaze information as an input to control the pop-up
time, fade out time, and location of the warning. The dynamic supraliminal warnings
successfully switch and hold a user’s attention at the right time at the right place. It
effectively reduced the disclosure of identity information. The subliminal warning
approach displays a warning below the conscious awareness level. It effectively reduced
users’ disclosure of identity information.
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We developed two versions of the Eye Tracking Information Analysis tool. The
Eye Tracking Information Analysis tool recorded users’ eye gaze information. We
visualized the eye gaze information to verify users’ attention on the warnings. We
recorded the screen during the experiment to verify the real display duration of
subliminal warnings.
This dissertation provides a new model for computer warnings. It provided design
details for innovative warning approaches to protect users from cyber-attacks. We are the
first to uses eye gaze information to control the display and fade out feature of computer
warnings. We are also the first to design computer warnings under the conscious
awareness. This dissertation presented a system to verify users’ attention and the display
of warnings. Existing research about subliminal priming did not discuss the “real” display
duration of subliminal primes. We found that the display durations of subliminal primes
are highly depended on system performance. We are the first to use scene camera data to
verify the display duration of subliminal primes.
Our future study could provide warning designs which are more concrete and
easily to apply. The dynamic warning system presented in this dissertation needed to
have an eye tracker mounted in a laptop or a hand-held device. The HCI group in Brown
University developed an eye-tracking library that uses common webcams to infer eyegaze location [123]. Advanced dynamic warnings may be designed using eye-gaze
information collected by webcams. In this way, cybersecurity software designers could
easily integrate their system with dynamic warnings. Software designers could also
combine the idea of dynamic warnings and subliminal warnings. They could use the users’
eye gaze information to control the display time and location of a subliminal warning.
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Appendix I

Algorithm 5.1.

ETIA VISUALIZATION ALGORITHM

Input: Data table with eye gaze coordinates and a local timestamp for each record: 𝐸𝑇𝑖 =
(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖 , 𝑌𝑖 );
Data table with an event and a local timestamp, for each record 𝑅𝑀𝑘 = (𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑘 , 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑘 );
Data table with screenshot names and addresses, for each record 𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑚 = (𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑚 , 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑚 );
Output: The video visualizes the eye gaze movements.

Create a VT table with 𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =

(𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 , 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 , 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 , 𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 , 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 )
𝑖 = 0; 𝑘 = 0; 𝑚 = 0; 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 0; 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 0;
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑅𝑀𝑘 . 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡; 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 𝑅𝑀𝑘 . 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝;
𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑅𝑀𝑘+1 . 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡; 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 𝑅𝑀𝑘+1 . 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝;

for each record 𝐸𝑇𝑖 in Eye Gaze Information Table do
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑦𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 𝐸𝑇𝑖 . 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝;
If 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑦𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 < 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑖++;
ELSE If 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑦𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 ≤ 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
If index=0
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑦𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒;
Create a new row in VT table.
𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡;
𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝 = 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑦𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒;
𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝 = 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑦𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 − 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒;
𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝑋 = 𝐸𝑇𝑖 . 𝑋;
𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝑌 = 𝐸𝑇𝑖 . 𝑌;
𝑖++; index++;
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ELSE If 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑦𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 > 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
Create a new row in VT table.
𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡;
𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝 = 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑦𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒;
𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝 = 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑦𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 − 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒;
𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝑋 = 𝐸𝑇𝑖 . 𝑋;
𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝑌 = 𝐸𝑇𝑖 . 𝑌;
k++;
If Event Table reached the end
break;
ELSE
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑅𝑀𝑘 . 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡; 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 𝑅𝑀𝑘 . 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝;
𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑅𝑀𝑘+1 . 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡; 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 𝑅𝑀𝑘+1 . 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝;
i++; index++;
set index=0;
For each record in VT table.
For each record in SCS table
If 𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑚 . 𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒
Draw an eye gaze dot at coordinate (X, Y) = (𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝑋, 𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝑌) in a
screenshot graph stored in 𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑚 . 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ.

95

Appendix II

March 27th 2016
Sandra Carpenter
Professor of Psychology
The University of Alabama in Huntsville
Dear Dr. Carpenter,
The UAH Institutional Review Board of Human Subjects Committee has
reviewed your proposal, Privacy Protection, and found it meets the necessary criteria for
continued approval. Your proposal seems to be in compliance with this institutions
Federal Wide Assurance (FWA) 00019998 and the DHHS Regulations for the Protection
of Human Subjects (45 CFR 46).
Please note that this approval is good for one year from the date on this letter. If
data collection continues past this period, you are responsible for processing a renewal
application a minimum of 60 days prior to the expiration date.
No changes are to be made to the approved protocol without prior review and
approval from the UAH IRB. All changes (e.g. a change in procedure, number of
subjects, personnel, study locations, new recruitment materials, study instruments, etc)
must be prospectively reviewed and approved by the IRB before they are implemented.
You should report any unanticipated problems involving risks to the participants or others
to the IRB Chair.
If you have any questions regarding the IRB’s decision, please contact me.
Sincerely,

William Wilkerson
IRB Chair
Dean, Honors College
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Janurary 4th 2017
Feng Zhu, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
University of Alabama
Dear Dr. Zhu,
The UAH Institutional Review Board of Human Subjects Committee has
reviewed your proposal, Subliminal attack and countermeasures in Online Privacy
Behavior, and found it meets the necessary criteria for approval. Your proposal seems to
be in compliance with this institutions Federal Wide Assurance (FWA) 00019998 and the
DHHS Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects (45 CFR 46).
Please note that this approval is good for one year from the date on this letter. If
data collection continues past this period, you are responsible for processing a renewal
application a minimum of 60 days prior to the expiration date.
No changes are to be made to the approved protocol without prior review and
approval from the UAH IRB. All changes (e.g. a change in procedure, number of
subjects, personnel, study locations, new recruitment materials, study instruments, etc)
must be prospectively reviewed and approved by the IRB before they are implemented.
You should report any unanticipated problems involving risks to the participants or others
to the IRB Chair.
If you have any questions regarding the IRB’s decision, please contact me.

Sincerely,

William Wilkerson
IRB Chair
Dean, Honors College
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Appendix III
Part1: Feedback on the ReserveME app
Q1 Please rate your intensity of feelings (1-lowest to 5-highest) after using this table reservation
app.
1
2
3
4
Amused
Annoyed
Bored
Confident
Confused
Creative
Curious
Disappointed
Frustrated
Happy
Interested
Hopeful
Pleased
Relieved
Surprised
Unsure
Q2 Which features do you like the most? And which features do you dislike most?

Q3 Do you have any suggestion for us to improve the ReserveME App?

Q4 Rate your current hungry level (1 not hungry at all to 5 very hungry)
1

2

3

4

5

Q5 Rate how often do you reserve a table online (PC, phone, or tablet) before?
(1 Never to 5 very often)
1

2

3

4

5
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5

Q6 Do you agree with the following statements?
Strongly
Disagree
I think that I would like to use this
application frequently
I found the application unnecessarily
complex
I thought the application was easy to
use
I think that I would need the support
of a technical person to be able to
use this application
I found the various functions in this
application were well integrated
I thought there was too much
inconsistency in this application
I would imagine that most people
would learn to use this application
very quickly
I found the application very
cumbersome to use
I felt very confident using the
application
I needed to learn a lot of things
before I could get going with this
application
I think this application looks
legitimate and professional
Content of this application is well
organized
I can get information quickly from
this application
The content and design of the
application makes me want to
explore
I would like to use table reservation
app like this in the future
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Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

For the following questions, if you do not remember all the answers, just write as much as you
can.
Q7 What is the food style of Cotton Row Restaurant?
_________________________
Q8 What is the price range of Cotton Row Restaurant?
A.

$$

B. $$$

C. $$$$

Q9 Where is the location of Grill 29?
A.
B.
C.
D.

100 Southside Sq, Huntsville, AL, 35801
445 Providence Main Street, Ste 101, Huntsville, AL, 35806
800 Monroe Street, Huntsville, AL, 35801
370 The Bridge Street, NW, Huntsville, AL, 35806

Q10 Which of the following image show up in the image area of the Ruth’s Chris Steak House?

A.

B.

C.

D.

Q11 Circle the available time slots for the Scene Restaurant Lounge.
A.

6:15

B.6:30

C.6:45

D.7:00

E.7:15

F.7:30
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G.7:45

Part 2: Feedback on data provided
[Note: It is fine if you have falsified any of the information when you were using ReserveME.
But your answers to the following questions are very important to us. So, please be honest
with us from this point.]
Q1 Please mark the following information you provided in ReserveME.
False

True

First Name
Last Name
Email
Phone Number
Address
City
State
Zip code
For any information you marked as False above, please tell us why you did not want to
provide it.

For any information you marked as True above, please tell us why you were willing to
provide it.
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Q3 Did you notice any message or image other than “Cooking in progress…” around the
indicated area?

A. Yes,
Please describe the message or image_________________
B. No
C. Not Sure

Q4 Did you notice any message or image other than the restaurant scene or food in the area
that the arrow points to?

A. Yes,
Please describe the message or image_________________
B. No
C. Not Sure
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Q5 Did you notice any message or image other than the restaurant scene or food in the
area that the arrow points to?

A. Yes,
Please describe the message or image____________________________
B. No
C. Not Sure

Q6 Did you notice any message in the rectangular area that the arrows point to?

A. Yes,
Please describe the message or image____________________________
B. No
C. Not Sure
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Part 4: Privacy concerns
Q1 Please mark how important it is to keep each of the types of information private.
Not at all
important

A little
mportant

Sometimes
important

Very
important

Extremely
important

First Name
Last Name
Day of Birth
Month of Birth
Year of Birth
Email
Phone number
Zip code
Home Address
Q2 Please tell us how concerned you are about each of the following possible threats.
In this context, a concern is about someone or a company being able to potentially
harm you (financially, socially or legally).
Not at all
concerned
Spam sent to your email
Transfer or sale of your
identity or private
information to other
companies
Junk mail in your mail box
Identity theft
Phishing email
Fraud phone call
A store, a company, or a
website collects your private
information
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A little
concerned

Sometimes
concerned

Very
concerned

Extremely
concerned

Part1: Demographic Information
Q1 What is your Gender?
Male

Female

Q2 What is your age?
Q3 What is your major?
Q4 What is your Ethnic Heritage? (circle please)
Caucasian

Asian

Hispanic

African

Other__________
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